

IMMANUEL KANT, 300 YEARS FROM NOW

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Booklet

**Coordination - Colloquium Philosophy
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Keynotes

Paul Guyer – Professor – Brown University, United States

Forma imperii and forma regiminis: The Form and the Spirit of Republican Government

For Kant, "republican" government is defined by both its goal or substance, the operationalization of the innate right to freedom in the form of freedom, equality, and independence, and its form, namely the division of power among a representative legislature, an agential executive, and a legislature, with different persons, natural or artificial, filling the distinct roles. But Kant also talks of rulers of a government that is not republican in form, a monarchy or other autocracy, ruling in a republican spirit or manner, that is, ruling in such a way as to grant and secure the republican rights to citizens even in the absence of a republican form of government. It is easy to think that he is conceiving of such a regime as transitional to a government that is republican in form as well as spirit. But I will argue that Kant's insight in the 1784 "Idea for a Universal History" that solving the problem of crooked timber requires both wisdom and good will, as well as his mature theory of freedom of the will, entails that good will is always required on the part of those in all positions of power, in whatever branch, even with the best constitution -- human institutions have to be operated by human beings, and humans can make or break any institution. There is no such thing as the rule of law as opposed to the rule of men, that is, human beings -- the best of laws are worthless without good will.

Keywords: republicanism, form of government, spirit of government, good will, innate right

Kant on Gender Domination and Caregiving Outsource

The civil standing of women looks like an entangled issue in Kant's anthropological and political philosophy, as they are regarded just as passive social agents despite their potential rationality and also as an essential part of a household they cannot maintain, but rather are expected to administrate and dominate through the power of emotions and the seduction they are supposed to stir up. In my paper I will first tackle the domination bonds underpinning Kant's depiction of the domestic order in the Anthropology from a pragmatic standpoint, for casting light on the manifold meaning of the term 'domination' in Kant's account of sexual difference and gender. In this section I will also address the consequences ensuing from the fact that wealthy women may outsource the care and childrearing tasks that their gender assigns to them. Second, I will parse out Kant's legitimation in the Doctrine of Right of an intervention of the state to avoid that unwed mothers will be exposed to religious and penal pains that demean their human dignity. Both cases also exhibit the role that social class fulfils to alleviate women oppression in a high patriarchal society just interested in the sexual honour they represent. I will claim that Kant views domestic service and public foundling houses as means charged with the commitment to guarantee the reproduction of life in wealthy households and to nurse and care of children begotten out of the wedlock, which challenges the contemporary approach to a fair distribution of caregiving.

Sebastiano Maffettone – Professor – LUISS University, Italy

Kant and the Crisis of Normativity

My paper discusses the contemporary crisis of traditional normativity. Traditional normativity has a Kantian legacy. I maintain in the paper that not only the traditional normative vision but also a possible alternative –which I call “normative from below” –vision can find its origins in Kant. This is an evolutionary view, which is also useful for overcoming the perverse split between ethics on the one hand and economics and science on the other. It goes back to Kant, and more precisely to what he argued in the second part of the Critique of Judgment devoted to teleological judgment (see Immanuel Kant, Critique of the power of the Judgment, Cambridge UP 2000, pp. 231 ff.). In this part of the work, the link between ethics and science in terms of normativity is evident—in my opinion—(as I will try to show).

Corinna Mieth – Professor – Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany (and Martin Sticker, Bristol)

The Formula of Humanity and the Mistreatment of Migrants: Indifference, Hostility and Degradation

We argue that Kant's Formula of Humanity (FH) must be expanded to capture some of the most significant types of mistreatments suffered by migrants: Indifference, Hostility and Degradation. Standardly, Kant's Formula states that we should treat persons, firstly, as ends in themselves, and, secondly, never merely as means. Many types of mistreatment of migrants (and others) can be plausibly understood as instrumentalization, such as modern slavery or exploitative labour, e.g., in the agricultural or domestic sector. However, the FH as it stands is not well equipped to deal with types of mistreatment in which the victim is not instrumentalized but treated as if they had not even instrumental value or treated as if they were of (instrumental or intrinsic) disvalue and thus constitutes a supposed threat. To accommodate these cases we introduce three additional categories of mistreatment into the FH: treating as mere thing, treating as a mere threat, and treating as a lesser human being. An expanded FH should mandate that persons are to be treated as ends in themselves, never merely as means, thing, threat and as of lesser value. Finally, we discuss how these categories are related to each other and how they relate to the Kantian assumption that a person is regarded as of unconditional value.

Arthur Ripstein – Professor – University of Toronto, Canada

Giving Laws to Ourselves

Kant's political philosophy rests on the idea that under rightful institutions, no person is subject to the private choice of another. Public institutions can only act through individual natural persons, and the decisions that they make will inevitably depend on particular features of those charged with making those decisions. I begin by explaining the conditions under which such contingent decisions can nonetheless count as consistent with everyone's freedom. I will then make the stronger claim that when democratic institutions are properly implemented, the law can be thought of as self-imposed by those who are subject to them.

Susan Shell – Professor – Boston College, United States

Kant as Soothsayer: Revisiting the Idea of History

In 1784 Kant called for a “philosophical attempt to work out a universal world history...that aims at the perfect civic union of the human species.” Fifteen years later, he would revisit the subject of civic progress in a tone that was at once hopeful and sardonic, ending with the suggestion that like Kant’s fabled patient, the human race might be “dying from sheer improvement.” My presentation will examine both the promise and the pitfalls of historical projection, with a view both to Kant’s own insights and to issues he may have missed. I will especially focus on three late essays: Perpetual Peace, A Renewed Question, and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.

Kant and economic democracy

According to an influential (“Toronto”) interpretation of Kant’s political philosophy, the Kantian objection to economic dependence is fundamentally about poverty. Eliminate poverty—read: propertylessness—and you have eliminated economic dependence. So Kant’s political economy of independence just is the dialectic of property and propertylessness under the modern state. This paper argues that crucial passages in the Doctrine of Right presuppose an account of Kantian economic dependence broader than mere propertylessness. Economic independence, for Kant, is co-extensive with self-standing (*selbstständig*) production for a competitive market—that is, independent commodity production. Kant’s political economy of independence is therefore not just about property and propertylessness, as the Toronto interpretation holds, but also about the independent exercise of the productive purposivenesses of free and equal people. I will show that this makes Kant’s economics friendlier to economic democracy than the Toronto interpretation allows and conclude with some comparisons between Kantian democracy and Rawls’s account of property-owning democracy.

Kant on Lying

Kant's ethical theory has been commonly misunderstood in several ways, but perhaps the most spectacular and persistent of them has to do with his views on the right and the ethics of veracity. The focus has often been on a brief and very late essay in which Kant appears to be saying that if a would-be murderer asks us where our friend (his intended victim) is hiding, then we must tell him the truth, thereby making ourselves complicit in the murder. Kant's view, so understood, seems so shockingly wrong that it has often been thought to discredit his entire ethical theory. There are several different misunderstandings involved in this way of viewing Kant's position: About the structure of Kant's ethical theory, his conception of obligation, the distinction in Kant's moral theory between right and ethics, and the way judgments about the consequences of actions can figure in judgments about the rightness or wrongness of actions. My talk today attempts to sort out and correct the common errors. Kant's position may not be entirely uncontroversial, and the issues themselves may be harder than is commonly appreciated. But I do not think Kant is guilty of the absurdities on the topic of lying and veracity with which he is commonly charged.

Presentation of Papers

Kant and the Right to Leave the War

As Schmitt has argued since the 1930s (and recently, among others, Danilo Zolo in Italy), war no longer follows the logic of the *jus publicum europaeum*. We have moved from an equal recognition between states to what Schmitt called *diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff*. The enemy is no longer my fellow man; war is no longer (only) *jus in bello*, but a war of criminalisation, a war that establishes the dividing line between human and non-human. We should have no difficulty admitting the context and reasons why Schmitt adopts this concept: he uses it in a 1938 essay to refer to England's "holy war" against Nazi Germany, for which Schmitt famously sided. This notion has been criticised from several points of view, e.g. by Habermas in the last part of his 1996 essay on Kant's perpetual peace with substantial arguments (which we will reconstruct within our communication). One of these is that Schmitt treats human rights, which should lead to war against the enemy of humanity, as immediately moral rights and not as "the logical consequence of the idea of constitutive rule of law", which can be extended beyond national borders. However, the real problem is that this new form of war, the discriminatory war, seems to persist in our time: the enemy is no longer a member of human consortium, but an enemy of humanity, which as such must be destroyed.

Since the two world wars, war has been transformed from a historical episode into a potentially permanent war: Ernst Jünger, and recently Toni Negri in *Moltitudine* and Giorgio Agamben in *Stasis*, have already reflected on this new scenario of war. Giorgio Agamben himself argues that a new science of war must be founded: *stasiology*, the science of stasis, of civil war. Permanent civil war denies the third and most important legal characteristic of the act of war according to Immanuel Kant: the right to exit (*herauszugehen*) from war. According to Kant, the presence of this right averted three dreadful forms of war: punitive war, which takes place between a superior and an inferior state and implies an external judicial sentence; the war of extermination, i.e. the consequence of a punitive war that leads to perpetual peace only at the price of the mutual destruction of the parties of the conflict ("the great cemetery of mankind"); and finally, the war of subjection. The concept of the right to leave war, i.e. a specification of the right to peace, is linked within Kant's argumentation to the right to neutrality "in the vicinity of war" and, above all, to the right of guarantee, i.e. "the right to have the maintenance of the stipulated peace guaranteed". But for such a right to exist, a subject capable of embodying it is needed. Thus, our presentation will focus on the section on the *Völkerrecht* in the *Metaphysics of Morals* to show the extreme actuality of these pages. Against the criticism of the alleged Kantian identification between morality and politics, we will try to argue the non-contradictory coexistence, in Kant's political thought, of a strong normative framework and a great historical realism.

Keywords: Kant; war; Schmitt; Habermas; Normative Theory

Alexey Salikov – Research Fellow and co-PI of the DFG project “Rationality as pragmatic worldly wisdom: Kant’s anthropology and the modern social sciences” – Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Germany

Kant's concept of pragmatic rationality and the problem of political rationality in the contemporary political theory and praxis

It is commonplace nowadays to blame certain politicians, political parties, organizations, or even entire nations as being illogical or lacking in reason. This question is not only theoretical, but also of the most practical importance, since political decision makers need realistically assess the actions of their partners and opponents. For instance, several public politicians, such as Javier Solana, Joseph Biden, Condoleeza Rice, assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin's actions were either unreasonable, inadequately rational, or downright crazy following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. But how accurate and fair are such accusations? Are politicians who commit immoral acts from our point of view really fools or crazy? Or should their actions be recognized as meaningful, but within the framework of a rationality completely alien to us?

The matter does not seem to be so simple, even if rationality is understood simply as the ability to set goals and to achieve them by appropriate means. The majority of political actors accused of irrationality can set goals (no matter how terrible these goals may seem to us) and achieve them. In doing so, they are not dealing with real stupidity or madness, at least in the medical sense. This implies that several forms of rationality, each with its own internal logic, can coexist in parallel in the political domain. By creating a comprehensive understanding of political reason, political theory seeks to address this issue and provide a framework for modeling the actions of political actors. Still, the construction of a fundamental theory of political rationality remains problematic and awaits its solution in the future.

A possible source of inspiration and fruitful idea for the development of such a theory of political rationality may be the Kantian model of social (pragmatic) rationality. The essence of pragmatic rationality is to set the right goals in social life, not only using other humans for own purposes but also dealing well with them, taking into account common affairs and societal welfare. Kant therefore offers political theory a way to understand how individuals might restrain their own egoism without ever fully renouncing their own objectives and interests (cf. Sturm 2017, 218). In my presentation I will analyze the potential of Kant's concept of pragmatic rationality to become a viable alternative to contemporary approaches to rationality in political theory. In order to accomplish this, I will introduce the idea of pragmatic rationality as a political rationality model and attempt to create a workable approach to the solving the security dilemma, a key concept in modern international relations theory for explaining how security-seeking states can end up in conflict.

Keywords: Kant, pragmatic rationality, political rationality, security dilemma, international relations

A Vacuous Capacity of Choice

Many of Kant's contemporaries seemed to agree with him that all moral actions are free actions. Disagreement arose when trying to determine whether immoral actions are free as well. This is often referred to as the Reinhold-Sidgwick problem. Commentators have addressed it by emphasizing the will (Wille) capacity for choice (Willkür) distinction. This differentiates between the aspect of the will that legislates the moral law, and the capacity to choose to follow said determination or not. This paper will aim to show that there is good reason to believe that Kant does not give an accurate account of choice within the context of his transcendental idealism. The debate will be framed through the works of Courtney Fugate and Paul Guyer, who provide differing approaches for and against the Wille-Willkür distinction as a solution to the Reinhold-Sidgwick problem. The interpretation of the Reinhold-Sidgwick problem will be based on Courtney Fugate's framing.

The literature on this critique predominantly centers on whether this distinction is present in Kant, with some defenders claiming that he both foreshadowed it and later explicitly presented it. What is often left unaddressed is whether if there is indeed a distinction between the will and the capacity for choice, then what is the nature of this capacity for choice? It appears as if the capacity for immoral "actions" which remain free and imputable to the actor cannot, in reality, be cashed out into any real decision made by an actor for any given action, then choice cannot be meaningfully articulated in the context of transcendental idealism for Kant. Through a discussion of the literature on the Wille-Willkür distinction, I aim to highlight some of the difficulties that the capacity for choice faces, and that the nature of this capacity is unable to address the demands that a common conception of choice would entail.

To conduct this project, I will survey the discussion that sparked the Reinhold-Sidgwick problem and Kant's response to his contemporaries. Paul Guyer's (2017) argument about Kant's foreshadowing of the distinction will provide some necessary context for how Kant later explicitly distinguishes the elements of the will (in a broad sense). This will bring into consideration Kant's writing on the matter in the *Groundwork*, the *Metaphysics of Morals*, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the *Religion*. The analysis of the relevant passages in these writings will allow for an assessment of the Wille-Willkür distinction and the current debate on the topic. The debate will be further enriched through the consideration of other contemporary authors who have weighed in on the debate. Christine Korsgaard's analysis of G.W.F Hegel's criticism of Kant, Julia Peter's reading of the role of *Gesinnung* in the faculty of choice, and Henry Allison's analysis of freedom in Kant's transcendental idealism will be necessary to provide a sketch of the landscape surrounding the Reinhold-Sidgwick debate.

Keywords: choice, action, Wille, Willkür, immorality

Angela Renzi – Post-Doctoral Researcher – University of Molise, Italy

Post-kantian perspectives: Fichte's foundation of natural law

This paper aims to be part of the vast debate in political philosophy about Kant's view of democracy, which can be fruitful, since it can be an "instrument" to face the challenges of the present.

The purpose of this paper is to approach the lesson on democracy that can be learned from Kant's political works from an indirect one that can be learned from Fichte, starting with Malik's thesis. Indeed, he argues that among Kant's interpreters, "radicals", such as Fichte, "defended an inclusive republicanism that included the universal right to decide whether or not to join the state" (R. Malik, *Kant's Politics in context*, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 80). However, I intend to examine Fichte's view of democracy more comprehensively, starting with the "foundation" of natural law.

In the first part, I will focus on the *Contribution to the Correction of the Public's Judgments on the French Revolution*, in which Fichte presents his first theory of natural law, based on the view that human beings are subject to the moral law. I want to show how the philosopher addresses the problem of the legitimacy of a right, namely the right to revolution, by emphasising the relationship of people in general to political power. In particular, I will underline the fact that when the State violates the natural right of man to exercise his true freedom and prevents the progress of culture, the people have not only the right but the duty to change it.

In the second part, I intend to focus on *Foundations of Natural Right*, comparing it with the *Contribution*, but also with *Review of Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace*, in order to underline the rational and transcendental deduction of the principle of law. From here, I intend to analyse the social contract, primarily through the contract of citizenship (paragraph 17). On the one hand, I want to highlight the fact that the State must create conditions for moral improvement; on the other hand, I want to underline that the people is the source of power and, as a united people, is always sovereign, even if it renounces the exercise of power by determining the ways of appointing rulers. (cfr. C. Cesa, *Noterelle sul pensiero politico di Fichte*, «*Rivista Critica Di Storia Della Filosofia*», vol. 23, no. 1, 1968, pp. 61–80: p. 69)

In the final section, I will show how Fichte's foundation of natural law proposes a "radicalisation" of Kantian principles, which can usefully influence the democratic ideal as an alternative to liberal democracy. I will also show how the vulnus today consists in the non-centrality of the role of education and culture in democratic practices, as well as in the absence of policies to promote the welfare of citizens.

Keywords: Natural law, Contract of Citizenship, Democracy, Culture, Welfare

Angela Taraborrelli – Professor – University of Cagliari, Italy

Kantian theory of citizenship and its contemporary application to the integration of migrants in Europe

This paper will address the topic of migrant acquisition of citizenship in Kant's political thought.

It would appear that, with the exception of Davies (2018), critics have concentrated on specific elements of Kant's theory of citizenship, rather than providing a comprehensive and systematic account. In particular, commentators have criticized the distinction between active and passive citizens, and the criterion for enjoying active citizenship, namely independence. This is because the criterion would not only arbitrarily favor those who occupy a certain socio-economic status, but also exclude women regardless of their economic status. For some, the independence criterion represents a pre-Lockian regression (Deagau, pp. 256; Saage, 1973, pp. 83ff); for others, it appears contradictory (Kersting, p. 257). Most commentators have questioned the philosophical soundness of Kant's discussion of citizenship as a whole, despite some attempts to defend it against the accusation of elitism. For instance, they have demonstrated that the exclusion of the non-independent is not equivalent to the exclusion of "those who are generically non-owners, but of those, but of those who are objectively dependent" (Gonnelli 1996, pp. 131-138; Caranti 2017), or have examined the relationship between Kantian citizenship and welfare (Shell 2016; Pinzani and Madrid 2016).

The recent surge in interest in Kantian cosmopolitanism has set a new research trend, with scholars exploring the Kantian notion of world citizenship (Held 1999; Taraborrelli 2004; Kleingeld 2013) and its relationship to State citizenship (Höffe 1999; Caranti 2022).

In light of the growing phenomenon of migration, a number of scholars have initiated an examination of the concept of cosmopolitan law, with a particular focus on the question of migrants' citizenship.

By mediating between Schnepf's position, which holds that for Kant every man should be able to become a member of the state (Schnepf 1999), and Benhabib's idea that cosmopolitan law is insufficient to guarantee a right of political membership for foreigners/migrants, (Benhabib 2004), Reinhardt demonstrates that the concept of contract provides a Kantian rationale for the transition from the right of visit to the right of residence, including the right of durable residence and full citizenship (Reinhardt 2019). It is important to note that Reinhardt presents his contribution as merely opening up a new avenue of research and acknowledges that his approach, while based on Kantian material, goes beyond Kant's explicit teachings on the conditions under which individuals may change status or acquire citizenship.

This paper will demonstrate that Kant's theory of citizenship does not preclude migrants from acquiring citizenship. This can be deduced from his theory of the state, his theory of citizenship and his concept of man's innate right. Furthermore, it will be shown how his theory of citizenship offers conceptual resources for the justification of both the introduction and the reform of the model of 'civic' integration of migrants adopted in recent years by most European countries.

Keywords: Kant, citizenship, migrants, civic integration

Kant on the feeling of an inner difference

In his work "Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space" (1768) and in his "What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?" (178), Kant argues that to orient oneself in the understanding and in the world (space), one needs to appeal to non-discursive means. Pure theoretical knowledge does not suffice. Where there is no external or observable difference, one needs affective means. The affective means that Kant has in mind in the two mentioned works, is an ability to feel a difference within one's own subject. Neither the subject, nor the objects, are able to orient themselves without such affective capacities. Considered in this way, feeling is an alternative mode of knowing to discursivity.

Kant's arguments in the "Directions" (1768) regarding the feeling of an inner difference, for instance the feeling of an inner difference between directions in space, still represent a puzzle in the commentary literature. Since this capacity of feeling is neither the spontaneity of discursive thought nor the receptivity of the senses, the account for this capacity represents an interpretative challenge. To try to get a better understanding of this capacity, I shall look at Kant's arguments in the "Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy" (1763) and give an analysis of the importance of Kant's conception of negative magnitudes for his view of cognition. In this work, Kant argues that negative magnitudes are efforts of the mind of which we are conscious through a feeling. I shall argue that this analysis may shed light on Kant's conception of orientation and its grounding in the capacity of feeling.

The subject has an inner feeling of the difference (the real opposition) between right and left (1768). If we compare this with what Kant discusses in the Negative Magnitudes (1763), we see that the form of mental activity takes the form of force, and an effort, and that it has degrees (and magnitude). So, when we have an impression of force, this is due to the negative magnitudes that are necessary components of our mental activity. Our internal impressions do have an "apparent energy". In 1763 Kant writes that the perception of this energy, or force, is neither a spontaneous cognition nor a receptive appearance, but rather a distinct feeling in the subject.

My analyses of Kant's conception of directions and of negative magnitudes, may give us a better key to the understanding of Kant's more general application of the principle of orientation in thinking. This has valuable implications for his understanding of the subject's autonomy and capacity to think for oneself.

Keywords: Feeling, Directions, Orientation, Negative magnitudes, Mental activity.

Can friendship make women autonomous? Kantian themes in Jane Austen's Emma

Many studies have challenged the phallogocentric nature of the male-centred notion of friendship prevalent in Western thought (Derrida, 1994; Anderson, 2010; Lochman et alii, 2011, Plastina, 2011; Seifert and Wilkin, 2015; but also Faderman, 1981; Vicinus, 2004). As has been shown (Robin, 1997; Cox, 1999; James and Kent, 2009), women of learning have been interested in friendship since the early modern period. However, it is in the sentimental novels written between the second half of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century that friendship became a matter for women and about women (Todd 1980; but also Garrioch, 2009). In these novels one finds different forms of female friendship, understood either as pure friendship involving only women, or as mixed friendship involving women and men, often indistinguishable from love.

Jane Austen's sentimental novels (Nazar, 2012) have attracted the attention of both early scholars of the idea of female friendship (Todd, 1975) and more recent scholars of Kant's thought. In one of the most relevant contributions to the subject (Grenberg, 2023), the friendship between Mary and Anne Eliot in Austen's *Persuasion* has been analysed to show that success in fulfilling the duties of love requires the expression of one's fundamental capacity for free choice in will and character, through the realisation of what Kant calls "inner freedom", namely freedom based on "autocracy" (Meister or animus sui compos and über sich selbst Herr zu sein or imperium in semetipsum: TL 6, 407-408).

My paper will focus on Austen's *Emma*. The friendship between Emma Woodhouse and Harriet Smith has been analysed in Kantian terms in order to shed light on defects in action and their connection to autonomy (Eilleen, 2018). Moreover, all the interrupted friendships (Perry, 1986) described in this novel have been seen as a confirmation and justification of Kant's scepticism towards the possibility that ideal friendship is attainable in practice (Thomason, 2015). Taking these and other studies (for example, Badhwar and Dadlez, 2018) into account, I will try to show that Emma ends up friendless and unable to form friendships because she has not developed the knowledge of her own limits that a morally virtuous individual needs and therefore her powers of mastery of affects, inclinations and passions are limited and contingent. In other words, in her case, the lack of friends is dependent on the lack of inner freedom and autocracy. In my analysis, Emma's friendships will be seen as forms of Kant's moral friendship, that is, the complete confidence of two persons in disclosing to one another their secret thoughts and feelings, so far as such disclosure is compatible with mutual respect (Marcucci, 1995; Paton, 1997; Sensen, 2013). If my interpretation is correct, autonomy would not be an outcome but rather a condition of possibility for moral friendship.

Antonino Drago – Professor – University “Federico II” of Naples, Italy

From Leibniz’s Labyrinths and Kant’s Antinomies to Science Foundations

Leibniz suggested two labyrinths where human reason “goes astray”: one about the two kinds of infinity and another about law and freedom ; the latter characterizes the subjective experience of a whole to be organized in a systematic way. In 1781 Kant wanted to formalize these reason’s impossibilities as contradictions in classical logic. By doubling the contents of the two labyrinths he applied them to four grandiose metaphysical subjects (the first labyrinth corresponds to the first and the third subjects; the second labyrinth corresponds to the second and the fourth subjects). He then produced four couples of *ad absurdum* proofs, each couple giving an “antinomy” between the empirical attitude and the idealistic attitude on these subjects. Yet, Kant’s interpretation of the results of these proofs is incorrect because the mathematics based on potential infinity only, the constructive one, is “classical mathematics plus intuitionist logic” ; more in general empirical thinking, being essentially of an inductive nature, relies on intuitionist logic. Hence, each Kant’s “antinomy” actually represents two parallel ways of logical reasoning on a same subject according to classical logic and intuitionist logic; these two logics are incompatible because the double negation law fails in the latter one. Instead of an antinomy, each couple of Kant’s proofs represents a dichotomy concerning either the kind of the infinity or the kind of organization of a theory.

Remarkably, these same two dichotomies emerged from the theoretical physics of the scientific revolution of early 1900’s. On these dichotomies the new theories, special relativity and Einstein’s 1905 theory of quanta, took the alternative choices (potential infinity and problem-based organization) to those of Newtonian paradigm (actual infinity and deductive organization) . This radical alternative in the basic choices gives reason of the revolutionary nature of the new physical theories.

All the couples of choices on the two dichotomies are four; they characterize four models of scientific theory (MSTs). From their comparison with Kant’s judgements his philosophy of knowledge results to be i) essentially based on the Newtonian MST; ii) a philosophical echo of the more advanced mechanics, i.e. the Lagrangian one of the homonymous MST. The latter point is in agreement with Kitcher’s analysis on Kant’s philosophy of science and gives reason of the persistent validity along two centuries of this philosophy of knowledge.

In retrospect, Leibniz’ and Kant’s philosophies of knowledge suggested the best hints for both recognizing the two dichotomies as the foundations of science and attempting to approach them.

Antonino Falduto – Professor – University of Ferrara, Italy

How to Materially Realize Kantian Autonomy: The Political Dimension of Women's Education

The paper aims at raising doubts about the history of freedom in Enlightenment Europe as it has been narrated until today, and showing how education needs to be taken into account if we are to theorize a material realization of freedom. It suggests starting with the concept of freedom as autonomy delineated by Kant and reconsidering it from the perspective of minor figures and marginalized groups. In this way, it proposes a new solution, from the Enlightenment, based on education, to fight inequalities (present also in the contemporary world) to which women philosophers in the eighteenth century considered girls were subjected.

Following up on recent studies on women and philosophy (Broad 2002; Broad/Detlefsen 2017; Detlefsen/Shapiro 2023; Dyck 2021; Green 2014; Karremann/Stiening 2020; Pal 2012), the paper will show why ethics and education are intrinsically interconnected, as Arendt already pointed out decades ago (Arendt 1954), and why education is a genuine political issue, which has to do with the practice of enabling marginalized groups and individuals to become autonomous in the precise etymological sense of legislating for themselves.

In order to shed light on the political dimension of women's education as a vehicle to materially realize Kantian autonomy, the paper will consider the German-speaking context. Some examples from the works by Dorothea Christiana von Erxleben (née Leporin), Luise Adelgunde Victoria Gottsched (née Kulmus), Elise Reimarus, Johanna Charlotte Unzer (née Ziegler), and Christiana Mariana von Ziegler (née: Romanus) will be considered.

Ari Belenkiy – PhD – Vancouver BC, Canada

Free Will, Determinism and the Veto Problem

The majority of ancient philosophers and medieval theologians adopted the view that every man possesses unrestricted Free Will, understood as freedom to choose one's actions consciously and arbitrarily, believing that "I do what I want and I want what I want." The falsity of these views was exposed by Arthur Schopenhauer who denied both Free Will, the ability to act without any motive, and Free Choice, the ability to react on the same motive arbitrarily. Schopenhauer's assumption of the stability of the human character, which served as the foundation for this denial, was remarkably confirmed by modern genetics. I review the prevailing views on Free Will before Kant and Schopenhauer and then discuss the lame, misleading treatment of this problem by several modern neuroscientists. The 'veto' problem becomes central – to address it, I propose to extend Libet's classical 1983 experiment.

Following Kant and Schopenhauer, I distinguish between man's empirical character (his actions) and intelligible (true) character, denying freedom for the former, but allowing it for the latter. I reformulate their theory within a two-level statistical-probabilistic framework, which is manifested in two basic statistical-probabilistic laws: the Law of Large Numbers and the Central Limit Theorem.

If there is "no Free Will" what is the legal ground for punishment for crimes? Isn't the man's crime inevitable in certain circumstances? This paradox became a banner for neuroscientists in their war against the legal system. They are blissfully ignorant that the problem was discussed and settled by Arthur Schopenhauer.

Robert Sapolsky is fond of paradoxes: e.g., "one cannot choose not to be a pedophile, but one can choose not to be a child molester." (Behave 2017, 597). His solution – to "resist destructive urges" – again shows the inadequate grasp of the Free Will problem. One cannot "resist" destructive sexual urges, as Sapolsky suggests, especially if one is genetically predisposed to have too many hormones secreting, since in this case, the Superego is powerless to supply a strong counter-motive and ID triumphs. Instead, one must build "fences" to avoid provoking the urges, the way Rabbi Akiba has taught. If one knows he is capable of assaulting a child or a woman, he must switch to another side of the street, or not go out at all, or go and live in the desert. Avoid meeting children or women altogether, if you are too weak to resist your urge to assault them.

But how does one know he needs a fence here or there? The understanding comes only after the fact, after the crime is committed. This brings us to the problem of punishing first-time criminals.

Schopenhauer recognizes the problem: first-time offenders get lesser sentences, as before their crime they don't know what they are capable of. The adolescents or those with damaged brain or under affectation must be spared the harshest punishment, as their intellectual freedom is still inadequate or impaired and so they fail to evoke prevailing cultural norms and their Ego, the prefrontal cortex, fails to adjudicate properly. This must be taken into consideration but can not be a reason to abolish the entire justice system as Sapolsky provocatively suggests.

Keywords: Free Will and Free Choice; Libet's experiments; the 'veto' problem; empirical and intelligible character; normal distribution

The Actual Significance Of Kantian Ethics in Relation to Respect

This proposal will be based on the concept of respect which is one of the keystone concepts of moral philosophy by Immanuel Kant who is one of the most important philosophers of the history. The form of morality of the human who is a social being will be considered by means of the concepts of respect and obligation which are found in his practical philosophy. Respect which is a principle determines the person for the relation constituted within the realm of common will be discussed by means of its necessity and certainty linked to duty and obligation. The difference by means of context and extent between respect and love which are two basic facts of social life will be pointed out. The primary law of the kingdom of ends is to act according to principles applicable to everyone. The citizens of Kantian kingdom of ends present the law to them only from pure reason; but the same citizens also become a part of the natural order of things. Despite this, the human being, who has the possibility of personal choice for his actions, is a feature that is not subject only to the natural order of things; we are aware of the existence of its pure rational structure. Freedom is a theoretical concept that cannot be found objectively in nature; in practical terms, it is a fact that we are definitely aware of because it forms the basis of a law that can determine an action. In this way, the law of an order by pure reason, outside the natural order, can be valid and asserts an objective obligation for rational beings. However, there are both subjective principles (maxims) and objective principles (laws) that determine the will. Now, creating the basis that determines the will from purely subjective principles and seeing them as valid as if they were objective is a feature of self-love, and turning this into an unconditionally practical principle is called arrogance. This is the main fact of disrespect. Determining one's own finite existence and its well-being as the only valid principle always and everywhere is selfishness in the form of arrogance. If the majority of individuals forming a society adopt such a principle, it is impossible for disharmony and hostility not to prevail. The ground for main motivation about this work is unwavering significance of Kant's way of thinking which its moral philosophy will be actual in spite of the absence of morality, self-esteem and respect emerged evidently by suffocative exploitation of capitalism of today. Since COVID times and during the days of ongoing wars, the concept of respect should be considered seriously, for being a human beyond the differences of ethnicity, race and gender is the main subject about the human rights. Kantian the kingdom of ends should be understood by this respect and self-esteem about the human rights.

Keywords: Morality, respect, society, person, obligation

The Disruptive Powers of Shared Agency

Although Kant's philosophy has undoubtedly been a source of inspiration in international law and democratic peace theory, it is generally deemed too metaphysically burdensome and morally demanding to be of practical use (Doyle 1983, Hurrell 1990, Ripstein 2009). I argue that the main reservations against the political significance of the Kantian approach can be set aside by appealing to constitutivist argument that appeals to the unity of practical rationality in support of moral obligations.

In the first section, I elucidate the category of constitutive vulnerability, which is rooted in human embodiment, but also in its embeddedness in social practices (Mackenzie et al 2014). Constitutive vulnerability is intrinsic to the human condition and explains both the pathogenic varieties of interdependencies and the interconnections that give rise to complex forms of interpersonal, social, and institutional agency (Author 2016). Mutually vulnerable agents are mutually susceptible to transformation. The resulting claim is that humanity is the collective subject 'to be constructed' contextually, via the shared exercise of constitutive norms of rationality.

In the second section, I argue that a particular type of moral sensibility explains the subjective bindingness of the constitutive norms of rational agency. This argument is informed by Kant's reflections on religion and perpetual peace and acknowledges the crucial role of practical attitudes such as respect, love, and hope for the generation of distinctive varieties of diachronic individual, shared, and institutional agency (Author 2021, and forthcoming).

In the third section, I argue that this constitutivist account of agency has a potential disruptive impact in the theory and practice of international relations. The debate is dominated by instrumentalist models of rational agency, based on minimal presuppositions about the rational powers of social and political actors. But instrumentalism comes at a price of stability. The recent rehabilitation of Kantian approaches to international relations makes only a very limited use of the theoretical resources afforded by constructivism and ultimately appeals to the progress of moral sentiments (e.g., Lindauer 2018), which is dissatisfactory (cf. Sterba 2013).

In contrast, the articulation of the constitutivist model of social agency brings to the fore considerations that directly challenge realism in international relations (Author forthcoming). First, constitutivism offers a unified account of justification which relates the two domains of duties centred on respect for humanity. The possibility of external enforcement does not negate the ethical nature of duties of right; it merely indicates that they can be fulfilled by mere external compliance. Second, constitutivism moves a decisive attack on instrumentalism, by showing that the instrumentalist principles of rationality depend on the categorical principles (Rawls 1980, O'Neill 1989, Korsgaard 2009). Finally, constitutivism provides a compelling argument in favor of the primacy of international over domestic justice. In the absence of the former, states would inevitably be compelled to engage in international conflict, suffering the consequences of devastation and upheaval until they reached a state of "complete exhaustion of their inner powers" (8:22–23). This argument serves as a valuable counterpoint to dominant forms of realism in the field of international relations.

Keywords: constitutivism, normativity, vulnerability, international relations

The Deduction of the Supreme Principle of the Doctrine of Virtue: Systematic Perspectives

Paragraph IX of the introduction to the Tugendlehre contains, by Kant's own admission, the deduction of the supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue. This is a new formulation of the categorical imperative, modeled on the Formula of the universal law, in which a different practical language is introduced, as a schema for applying the moral law to the will of a natural rational being. The new formula revolves around the concept of end, or the maxim of ends, though its systematic value is not directly analyzed.

Our contribution aims to stimulate reflection on the meaning of purposiveness expressed in this late Kantian work. Initially, it might seem evident that the end in question is a certain moral objective to be realized (not far from the ethical taxonomy that permeated Baumgarten's *Ethica philosophica*). However, the issue becomes more complex when one analyzes the definition of ends proposed by Kant and their systematic development.

Self-perfection and happiness of others are the two macro categories identified as commanded by pure practical reason: ends that are together duties. A closer examination of the (few) definitions of these duties suggests, however, a radical shift in perspective. The purposiveness Kant is discussing does not seem to be entirely synonymous with an objectual end; rather, the discourse operates on the transcendental level of a universal perspective of purposiveness, or, more precisely, of the form of purposiveness. The answer to the question: "What end is the end of pure reason?" does not seem straightforward, and we believe that Kant himself excludes a precise and delimited answer. Considering purposiveness as a transcendental perspective means engaging deeply with the assumptions of the third Critique and, we believe, also with the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, where an end is considered from the plural and total perspective of the symbolic schematization of a Kingdom of God subjected to the primacy of pure reason. Purposiveness, with blurred contours and framed within a horizon of practical determination, is the protagonist of the second part of the *Metaphysics of Morals*. By assuming the transcendental condition of setting ends in general, this final part of Kantian ethics transforms its systematic task into a philosophy of the moral human being, a description of an incessant, dramatically uncertain effort towards realizing the moral law in the world.

This uncertainty affects not only the subjective conditions of the will but also transforms Kant's architectonic. "System" cannot be the complete development of the ethical science starting from the Critique but becomes a transcendental indication of the possibility of an ethics for human beings without confining it to concrete obligations. The "doctrine" that follows the Critique presents itself as a schematic-practical element, but, alone, not sufficient for defining the morality of history. To paraphrase Kant, the effective good will is not realized through the simple position of the dutiful ends of the Tugendlehre (which are, therefore, no principles of direct action), but opens to the determinations of history and politics, to the fully *Darstellung* of the system, which can never be fully accomplished.

Keywords: Tugendlehre, purposiveness, system, deduction, ethics.

On the legacy and future influence of Kant's views on the limits of empirical psychology

The best method at our disposal for making reliable predictions about the future is using inductive inferences based on past experiences. Following this method, Kant's idea that phenomenal consciousness cannot be fully explained on physical grounds alone stands out as one of his most enduring philosophical achievements. In my presentation, I will highlight three major philosophical discussions that support the hypothesis that this Kantian position will remain relevant, even 300 years from now.

First, I will focus on Kant's own explicit contributions to this thesis. I will emphasize Kant's views concerning rational and empirical psychology as expounded in the Critique of Pure Reason, his contributions to the 18th-century controversy on the 'seat of the soul' and his warnings about the danger of material reductionism to the Enlightenment-project. Here, it is my aim to shed light on the diversity of Kant's motivations to affirm the irreducibility thesis, ranging from his metaphysics to his moral philosophy and philosophy of the natural sciences. Turning to the late 19th century and early 20th century, I will address the controversy concerning 'psychologistic' approaches to Kant's philosophy. The emergence of empirical psychology as an independent, scientific discipline in the second half of the 19th century, paired to naturalistic approaches to Kant's transcendental philosophy favored the strong affirmation of so-called anti-psychologism, as championed by Cohen, Natorp and Husserl. From these first two instances, confirming the long-lasting legacy of Kant's irreducibility thesis, I will turn to the contemporary debates concerning physical explanations of consciousness in the context of cognitive science. Important technological and theoretical advances in the field of neuroscience in the 1990's, and most importantly methods of non-invasive brain imaging, sparked the proliferation of psycho-physical explanatory approaches to phenomenal consciousness. Since, the collective realization that, despite these important technological advances, any explanation of the so-called "Hard Problem of Consciousness" must consider conceptual reasons has favored the development of the pluri-disciplinary approach to the human mind that today goes by the name of 'cognitive sciences'. The ever-growing awareness of the importance of conceptual, or philosophical, reasoning in this field, is to be read, I claim, as part of the legacy of Kant's irreducibility-thesis and further evidences its longevity. Based on this threefold confirmation of the past influence and permanency of this thesis, ranging from the 18th to the 21st century, I conclude that we have good reasons to believe that this thesis will likely remain relevant and influential for decades and even centuries to come

Keywords: Anti-Reductionism, Anti-Psychologism, Naturalism, Consciousness, The Hard Problem

Kant and the scope of justice

Several different moral approaches have been offered to assess the situation of the billions of distant human beings that are currently facing a situation of stark poverty in the world. One of them typically starts by analyzing what the rights of those who are in need are. The question asked in this context is “what ought I (or we) get?” However, as O’neill points out, such an account leads to the complication that even if we identify what those rights are, it will not be clear who will have the obligation to discharge them.

A much more fruitful alternative is to start with Kant’s question of what our obligations to those who are in need are. The typical question in this context is “what ought I (or we) do?” Once we answer this, it will be easier to understand what is required from us in order to help others.

There are two competing answers to this question. Both of them have been made within the Kantian framework. The first one is that in a world where technology and communications make global beneficence practicable, Kant’s duty of aid should be extended globally to every person, regardless of the nationality to which he belongs. The second one is that the duty of aid is inherently local. We are closely connected to those around us, through personal interaction, shared institutions, etc. in a way that we are not with those who are far away. This suggests that local relationships will have a different character than distant relationships. Also, the fact that we are physically present in the place where those who require aid are makes us more familiar with the situation at hand and, therefore, more competent to judge what exactly the situation of the needy is. We can act confidently and directly, and usually no thorough analysis of the situation is required. Help to distant strangers require, on the contrary, special burdens of investigation and on creativity in response. If we donate to a charity institution, for example, we will have to make sure that the institution is not corrupt and that it really delivers the aid it claims to deliver.

Herman, in the article “The scope of moral requirement”, defends the second approach. In particular, she argues that a correct interpretation of Kant’s account of obligatory ends and the imperfect duty they support tend to favor, in some sense, the interpretation that we should have a bias toward the local in beneficence.

In this paper, I shall try to show that, even if Herman’s interpretation of Kant is correct, her conclusion that there is priority to the local when aiding others does not seem well supported. This will be an indirect way of showing that it could be argued that Kant’s duty of aid does not seem to discriminate in favor of fellow citizens.

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Immanuel Kant and Giacomo Casanova children and prophets of the Enlightenment

There are perhaps no characters as different who populated the Age of Enlightenment as Kant and Casanova. Although they were contemporaries—Casanova, 1725, very tall, Kant, 1724, very short—their lives and thoughts were more than different, perhaps even opposites. Yet, they are both significant children and prophets of their era.

For Casanova, realizing the Enlightenment primarily meant traveling. In a century where new lands were still being discovered, Casanova preferred to roam around Europe first and foremost to live, but also with open eyes to understand. Only when he became old did he decide to recount in 3,700 pages what he had seen. Kant, on the other hand, never left Königsberg; yet, from his desk and through reading, he managed to interpret the entire world.

Casanova knew the main representatives of the Enlightenment, starting with Voltaire and Rousseau. Kant, however, limited himself to having Rousseau's portrait affixed in his bedroom without ever having the courage to write to him.

Casanova having had many lovers was not only his boast, but perhaps the reason we still remember him today. Whether Kant ever had a sexual life remains a mystery. Neither of them married nor acknowledged any children of their own, although Casanova believed he was a natural father.

Kant didn't just write about ethics; he also lived his life with rectitude. Quite the opposite of Casanova, who broke many of his era's taboos. He entertains the reader with his antics without showing any remorse, and thanks to this, he manages to absolve himself.

Raised in the Catholic world, the first, and in the Lutheran world, the second, they were both agnostics, even though they always questioned the existence of God. Reluctant to accept superstition in theory, they both tried to free themselves from it. As for the beliefs upheld by many alchemists, magicians, and seers of their time, they both knew well that these were nonsense. But while Kant never compromised himself with these circles, Casanova found a way to take advantage of his contemporaries' credulity, so much so that fraud and gambling were his main sources of livelihood.

Both were prolific authors in very different fields. Before awakening from his dogmatic slumber, Kant wrote about everything: mental illnesses, the origin of earthquakes, fire, and races. Casanova was no less, albeit with less success, trying to be a novelist, translator, and historian. Yet, only in their later years, especially for their time, did they manage to produce the works that made them famous.

Kant's answer to the question: "What is Enlightenment?" was clear and strong, not so much that provided by Casanova. But perhaps it wasn't so different...

What obligations do exist in the Kantian state of nature?

Kant certainly does not conceive the state of nature as void of rights. Not only do individuals have the innate right to freedom, which includes at least life, bodily integrity and freedom of movement, but also the right to acquire and possess external objects of choice, i.e. to rightfully treat objects which are not in their physical possession as their own. Both of these rights, being rights, imply corresponding obligation of everyone to refrain from encroaching upon the freedom of others and not to interfere with the objects they have rightfully acquired. And as “right is connected with an authorization to use coercion”, Kant makes clear that prior to entering the civil condition individuals resist with right those who interfere with what is rightfully theirs. In this understanding, the problem with the state of nature is mere lack of security with respect to what is internally or externally mine, as some commentators claim.

At the same time however, Kant designates the state of nature as an unrightful condition (*nicht-rechtlicher Zustand*), and “the state of externally lawless freedom”, in which individuals “do one another no wrong when they feud among themselves”. Moreover, they not only can, but have the right to preventively attack one another, because it is impossible to be certain of the intention of others. This brings us closer to Hobbes, according to whose understanding, “all men had right to all things” in the state of nature.

Taken together, these two depictions of the state of nature seem to give us a contradictory model in which state of nature is simultaneously condition with and without rights and duties, or at least a model in which individual has rights, but others have no corresponding duties. The intention of our paper is to examine this two-sided account of the state of nature and show its significance for the postulate of public right, which asserts moral necessity of leaving the state of nature and entering the civil condition. Crucial in this respect is Kant's insistence that duty demanded by the postulate is not only moral, but also juridical, meaning that it is morally allowed to coerce others into entering the civil condition. Although individuals have specific rights in the state of nature, they are not just insecure, but also contentious in their scope and application, and open to disputes. This is why, in absence of “a collective (common) general and powerful will” no one has in the last instance the obligation to respect the rights of others. In other words, everyone has the moral authority to use coercion in protecting themselves or that which they consider theirs, but others have no obligation to succumb to that coercion, i.e. they have an equal right to resist others with coercion. However, the only unambiguous obligation everyone does have is not to resist the demand of others to establish the civil condition. Coercion used in attainment of that goal is the only coercion which is in full accordance with the freedom of everyone.

Keywords: Rights, obligation, coercion, state of nature, postulate of public right

Kant's Cosmopolitanisms: the good, the bad and the ugly

In my paper, I investigate the contemporary applicability of Kant's various cosmopolitanisms, i.e., that of progress, cosmopolitan right and ethical community.

I claim first that Kantian vision of progress towards perpetual peace through legislation is entangled in his hierarchical conception of human races and promotes indeed a very narrow and exclusive vision of human prosperity. The combination of trade relations according to western rules with the cultural and juridical domination of white people over the rest of humanity is a grim prophecy of the injustices ailing contemporary world. Despite Kant's best intentions, even a partial fulfillment his idea brought about first domination and marginalization of the majority of world population, both in terms of culture and resources necessary to thrive.

Secondly, I argue that Kant's cosmopolitan right is not fit for contemporary appropriation of this concept in the discussion on migration and refugee rights. The main issue with a piece of theory, which aims at protecting the hospitable hosts in foreign lands from their European guests is the shift in power relations between the foreign people and Europeans, which happened over the past 300 years. In his time, Kant rightfully addressed the problem of colonialism by imposing the limits on hospitality and human mobility. However, the contemporary global relations concerning the latter desperately need new ideas in accordance with the justice built on right to freedom and equality of all peoples.

Finally, I aim at showing that the proper source of cosmopolitan inspiration for contemporary problems is Kant's conception of ethical community. Since it does not suffer from the implication in particular historical circumstances of Kant's times (to which he applies his doctrine of right), its potential of informing our contemporary thinking can be safely investigated without recurring to speculation on Kant's 'true intentions'. The conception of ethical community combines two simple yet groundbreaking ideas: that humans are rational moral beings and that their flourishing require the community with others, who share their values and support their causes. The aim of expanding this community to encompass whole mankind, including future generations can bring about answer to questions concerning not only individual conduct, but also global policies and global justice. Taking the universal standpoint cannot be exhausted in designing abstract principles but rather must be followed by the practice of learning and accommodating to particular circumstances of others – only then can we become truly dedicated to fostering human flourishing.

Keywords: cosmopolitanism, progress, cosmopolitan right, global justice, ethical community

Between Bodies: Kant on Sex, Marriage and Consent

Kant sees, in sex, a moral problem. What most commentators identify as the moral problem is the fact that, for Kant, the sexual impulse is a 'cannibalistic impulse'. Kant's condemnation of the sexual impulse is amongst his most important contributions to the philosophy of sex. Yet, the insistence on this being the moral problem has obscured much of what Kant has to offer to the discussion. It is not that this reading is incorrect; it is incomplete. For Kant, sex is not just an ethical peril, but also a 'legal' one.

As a problem of right, it has little to do with the objectifying sexual impulse. The 'legality' of our actions, Kant explains (MM 6:219), does not depend on the incentives from which we act but on the nature of the actions that ensue. As Elizabeth Brake (2005; 2012) has argued, if the problem were grounded in the sexual impulse, it could not be one of right. I do not think that Kant misplaced his discussion of sex in the Doctrine of Right, but rather that what he there says has little to do with the sexual impulse.

In the Doctrine of Right, Kant is worried about the nature of the activity the sexual impulse is an impulse for. What makes sex stand out, for Kant, is that, in sex, we make use of someone's body. We grab, we caress, we hug, we kiss, we touch, and we are penetrated by another person's body. But, because a person is an 'inseparable unity', we cannot act on a body without acting on someone. What Kant is getting at, I argue, is that sex is, necessarily, something that happens between persons.

Contractual rights are, therefore, ill-suited to render sexual interactions rightful. Giving someone a contractual right to our body for their sexual use is not unethical but, according to Kant, impossible. It is impossible because it requires alienating our innate right, which amounts to renouncing our legal agency. Kant proposes that the solution, rather than in contracts, is to be found in marriage. Marriage solves the problem by constituting a 'unity of will' between partners. When we marry, we acquire a right to make use of each other's body together – 'as if having only one body' (DrMM 20:463). If the problem is that sex is something that is done between persons, the solution is that sex is something that can only be rightfully done together.

I, then, move beyond exegesis to show that this reading is a valuable resource for feminist critics of contemporary sexual ethics. Kant's philosophy of sex offers, first, rich insights to undermine the dominant contractual understanding of consent as a normative power. Furthermore, Kant's marital 'unity of will' serves as fertile ground for a non-contractual account of consent. I end by suggesting that we understand consent not as an agreement we reach before we have sex but, rather, as a way of having sex. When we have sex consensually, we have sex together, with a united will.

Keywords: Unity of Will, Consent, Sex, Innate right, Marriage

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Transcendental Philosophy and Theory of Science: Kant, Fries, and the Possibility of a Critical Metaphysics of Nature

Popper was one of the most prominent theorists of science to have seriously confronted two different versions of transcendental philosophy: that of Kant and that of Fries. The contemporary debate that has ensued (from Lakatos onward) has sought to shed light on the terms and conditions from which a fruitful marriage of scientific and philosophical reflection can be given. Important contributions have also been made in this regard by theorists of science close to the second Friesian school (e.g., Paul Bernays).

My presentation is devoted to illustrating some of the options taken by theorists of science (Popper, Lakatos, Bernays, among others) who have attempted to show how Kantian-Friesian transcendental philosophy can be an indispensable interlocutor for scientific inquiry through the foundation of a critical metaphysics of nature.

Realising Freedom in the Kantian Era: The Case of a Philosophical Book for Women

The fundamental socio-empirical changes of the eighteenth century revealed multifaceted possibilities of free human action, contributing to a paradigm shift in understanding freedom as self-determination and autonomy. Kant occupies a fundamental role in this context: his revolutionary conception of freedom profoundly influenced philosophy from his era to the present day, crystallising Enlightenment ideals. Indeed, Kant stands as the intellectual figure who synthesised different strands of thought from the Enlightenment into a coherent philosophical system. However, amidst the intellectual ferment preceding Kant's systematic philosophy, the contributions of women philosophers to the development of the conception of human freedom as self-realisation were pivotal yet highly overlooked.

This paper aims to elucidate the distinctive role of Johanna Charlotte Unzer within the context of the popular turn in the German Enlightenment, which sought to disseminate philosophical culture to a broader audience and significantly influenced Kant's original conception of freedom. Firstly, Unzer advocated for an aesthetic approach to philosophy intended to reach an uneducated public. Secondly, within the context of egalitarian proto-feminism, Unzer championed a pragmatic approach to the education of the unlearned.

The autonomous value of Unzer's work is demonstrated through her relationship with Meier and her association with the University of Halle, positioning her contributions within the framework of Popularphilosophie. This paper intends to show that her critique of mathematics was not merely a rejection of a dry discipline perceived as incompatible with feminine nature, but rather part of a broader advocacy for knowledge aimed at moral education. Unzer consistently emphasises the intellectual equality between men and women, arguing against the pursuit of mathematical and scientific knowledge for its own sake, in favour of knowledge directed towards the moral education of women and humanity at large.

Furthermore, as the first German woman philosopher, Unzer's significance is underscored by her decision not only to challenge traditional assumptions regarding women's role but also to provide practical means for cultural improvement through her philosophical handbook in the German vernacular. Unlike contemporaries such as Christiane Erxleben and Amalia Holst, who critiqued societal prejudices limiting women's access to education, Unzer pursued a direct approach, aiming to empower women and the uneducated through accessible philosophical works.

Unzer's proactive engagement targeted women and the unlearned, embodying both the 'popular' turn in the mid-18th century aimed at broader knowledge dissemination and a strategic effort to assert her ideas within an unfavourable historical context. Her declarations in both "Naturlehre" and "Weltweisheit" positioned her as an equal among male philosophers, advocating for the training of female philosophers. This paper contends that Unzer's "Weltweisheit" should not be merely regarded as a simplified handbook for the uneducated but rather as an original contribution to the goals of Popularphilosophie. It exemplifies one of the means available to women at the time, whose intellectual activity was often undervalued: that of a pedagogically oriented written work.

Overall, this paper aims to highlight Johanna Charlotte Unzer's philosophical contribution as an advocate of a significant aspect of the German 18th century: the dissemination of Enlightenment culture to a broad audience, within the framework of a belief in progress and the realisation of rationality, which allowed for what Kant described as "the emergence of humanity from its self-imposed immaturity" (Kant, *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?*).

A Kantian Account of Free Markets

“Free market” ideas have played an enormous role in politics and economics since the Second World War. Neoliberalism is based on the claims that markets promote individual freedom and that markets are free when they involve a minimum of government regulation. The problems of modern capitalism (such as those highlighted in the conference outline: democratic deficits, environmental damage, stark inequalities) tell a more unhappy story. In response, many argue that governments should constrain or limit markets: freedom is a problem, not always a virtue.

This paper proposes an alternative framing, more Kantian in spirit. We should see free markets as public goods that enable people to act as means, but not mere means, for one another. This proposal goes beyond the letter of Kant’s texts, but I suggest it has good grounding in his fundamental ideas.

On first element: free markets as public goods. It is often assumed that markets arise simply from people using their private rights to property and contract. In fact, this permits only a few private trades: for example, when we swap apples for pears over our garden fence. Apart from money, also a public creation on Kant’s account (6:288f), there must be public fora where buyers and sellers encounter one another, without interfering in one another’s freedom. (Compare Ripstein’s analysis of roads as public highways: 2009, Ch.8.) Kant notes the role of the “police power” in regulating the marketplaces of his day. Modern markets are more complex and variegated – from shopping malls to online fora to financial markets. These markets rely on legal structures which Kant only glimpsed in their inception: business corporations and intellectual property, for example. Even more than physical marketplaces, they require detailed rules and oversight to function well, and to avoid damage to other public goods (such as clean air or the information needed for public reasoning).

The second element: free markets enable people to act as means, but not mere means, for one another. In his lectures on natural right, Kant stresses that contracts enable people to act as means for one another while respecting one another as ends-in-themselves (27:1319). The complex structure of modern markets means that most people do not negotiate one-to-one; instead we usually act within or in relation to business corporations. If those structures operate inequitably or opaquely, then we may argue that people cannot participate freely and are used as mere means. Kant argues that courts cannot deal with inequity; I suggest that public right can, and must. For example, if the legal structure of business incorporation empowers shareholders and disempowers employees, we should not be surprised to see inequity in benefits and contributions. In such cases, legislatures can reform the legal frameworks to make them more equitable and transparent – for example, to ensure that employees are represented and informed within business corporations (Anderson 2017).

If markets are to be public goods that are consistent with equal freedom, there must be public mechanisms to make sure that they operate equitably, transparently, and without using people as mere means.

Keywords: markets, freedom, public goods, equity, instrumentalization

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Is Kant's principle of human dignity absolute?

A common postcolonial critique of Kant's ethics is that Kant's own prejudiced remarks cannot be dismissed, since they betray a systematic problem in his notion of moral worth (Huseynzadegan 2022). This Kant-critique arguably stems from a conflation of capacity and ability in interpretations of Kant's account of *Vermögen*. If human dignity adheres to persons not in virtue of their rational ability, but by virtue of their being of the kind (category) human being (i.e. possessing the capacity for reason), then it would appear to be a moral principle that carries universal necessity for all persons of this category (hence the "categorical imperative").

In this talk, I begin by sketching such a notion of human dignity grounded in the capacity for reason, but question the basis on which this moral principle might be thought to be absolute. I argue that while Kant is able to lay claim to the universality of human dignity as a necessary principle for all human beings (Guyer 2024, Ameriks 2024), he occasionally and unnecessarily restricts the scope of human dignity such that it carries only categorical moral worth, not absolute moral worth. We can see this with two hypotheticals of the status of human dignity in relation to (i) a non-human alien intelligence, and (ii) artificial general intelligence of a certain kind. Ideally, Kant's notion of human dignity would ground not merely the recognition of human dignity among all beings falling under this category, but also for any possible non-human intelligence. Because Kant ties the categorical imperative and human dignity to specifically human form of discursive reason (Pollok 2017), it is not clear how a non-human intelligence could be said to be subject to the same normative necessity that it recognize the dignity of all persons. This is not just a theoretical question stemming from the hypothetical scenario of encountering non-human alien species with divergent forms of sensibility and intellectual activity. It is an increasingly pressing problem with the nearing possibility of artificial general intelligence. On what grounds should a generative, self-determining form of artificial general intelligence (not current narrow forms such as multimodal large language models, MM-LLMs), recognize the absolute status of human dignity? This question is pressing, not because of some dystopian worry from science fiction. Rather, the very nature of AI will increasingly press against the boundary of human dignity. Just as an elephant gives no thought to the insects in its path, the trajectory of parameters of AI to find the most efficient path toward its own end (whether pre-given or self-given) will eventually necessitate the transgression of human dignity, not from any problematic or immoral aim, but from the rightful recognition that human beings are often obstacles to a range of pragmatic, natural, and even moral goods. But such transgression of human dignity cannot be said to be a violation of the categorical imperative, since the categorical imperative carries moral authority only for those within the category: i.e. discursive reasoners. The question is: on what ground can human dignity be claimed to be absolute? While Kant did not conceive of it as absolute (but rather as categorically necessary), I argue that a claim to the absolute necessity and status of human dignity is nevertheless groundable in Kant's fundamental account of the moral law and the autonomy of the will in the nature of reason as such (GS 4:412), transcending the limitations of the categorical application and so facilitating a claim to absolute human dignity. However, this claim to absolute human dignity gives rise to a unique problem of duty entailed within the context of non-human moral ends.

Finance and the financialization of society: some critical aspects

In my presentation I would like to discuss some aspects of the effects produced by finance and financial practice in the shaping of our societies; in particular, on the way financial knowledge is produced and shared, citizens' access to it and how the technologies used in finance participate in such knowledge sharing and production. By the term "knowledge" I mean the understanding of financial practices and instruments and also the ways in which such knowledge can be appraised by non-practitioners in an epistemologically meaningful way, thus strengthening or diminishing their participation and agency within society.

Several authors (Ippoliti, 2020; Cohen, I.G. 2003) have discussed the impact that finance, its practices and its approach have on both the economy and on our society as a whole, describing such impact as the "financialization of society". Following (Polanyi, 1944), it could be argued that the financialization can be understood as a form of generalized commodification of many aspects of our ordinary life as the main tenets of classical economics and finance provide a general sociological and moral description of human social behaviour. For instance, commodification has worked as an economic and cultural process according to which individuals and societies on their whole are interpreted as some kind of institutional model within which competition and greed represent the sole social driving forces. Some effects of such financialization of society can be detected in the fact that many aspects considered expressions of civic rights are treated like commodities: our houses can be considered as assets in the market, our health is an asset which can be rated as more or less convenient to invest on, the question of wealth redistribution is not a central goal but rather a mere side-effect. In this context, the concept of society is reinterpreted as a mere annex to the market. Not only the question of democracy and civic participation within the social sphere is here questioned, but also the possibility for individuals to understand and critically appraise the current financial institution and practices as one possible theoretical narration among others.

In my presentation I will propose an alternative approach towards finance (Fumagalli, 2016) and its interrelation with society based on the notion of commons, moving from the hypothesis that in order to build a different relation between society and the economic and financial sector in which individuals have a full agency and knowledge, alternative economic and financial narration (Lucarelli, 2014) and practices are necessary.

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Philosophy within the Battlefield of the World: On the Ongoing Polemical Work of Kantian Critique

Looking at our very present world, the claim for enlightenment – as paradigmatically embodied by Kant's philosophical project –, indeed, seems to have undergone a deep crisis. As one of the most striking aspects of this crisis, one cannot help noticing recent series of wars that seemed – often accompanied by enthusiastic references to Kant's ideal of a peaceful world order – overcome after 1989. Against this background, one easily may come to the conclusion that Kant's claim for enlightenment should be seen as not alive any more, as the naïve stance of a past epoch. Confronted with this obvious crisis, the present contribution, however, suggests to re-evaluate the critical character of Kant's project in order – in contrast to this conclusion – to emphasize its very actuality on both a theoretical and a practical level. Against an image according to which we ever would (and could) live in the stage of an accomplished enlightenment, Kant rather explicitly emphasizes the character of enlightenment as an unfinished process dependent on the ongoing work of upcoming generations.

And accordingly, peace, for Kant, explicitly cannot be seen as an empirical stage of history but as a regulative ideal that as such – paradoxically – depends on the very actuality of sharp historical antagonisms. In a line and combined with this practical-historical aspects, Kant also theoretically stresses that transcendental critique is involved in an ongoing struggle, a battlefield ("Kampfplatz") against permanently re-emerging dogmatist conceptions – instead of being a stance that could be stabilized and accomplished once and for all. And it is precisely and only by participating in this struggle, in this polemical confrontation, by entering the real world of permanent crises, conflicts, and destabilizations that Kantian critique stays alive and becomes effective instead of being a merely, worldless ideal (as wrongly attributed to Kant's position). Ultimately, it is only by being embedded in this per se conflictive and antagonistic world, as "Weltbegriff", that for Kant philosophy becomes more than a "scholastic" business devoid of any practical implications.

The present argumentation aims to dwell on this intrinsic – systematically and methodologically founded – polemical character of Kant's project in order to argue for its ongoing actuality in a world of persistent crises, conflicts, and wars.

Keywords: Conflict, Crisis, (Transcendental) Critique, Enlightenment, Philosophy of History, War

Der Charakter und das Klima: Temporale Bedingungen menschlicher Handlungsfähigkeit nach Kant

Planetare Bedrohungen wie der Klimawandel und der Verlust an Biodiversität lassen sich nur bekämpfen, wenn die Menschen sich nicht bloß gelegentlich spontan dafür entscheiden, ihr Verhalten am Erforderlichen auszurichten, sondern wenn sie ihr Verhalten dauerhaft umstellen. Dazu müssen sie aber erst bereit sein: 1. Sie müssen erkennen, was objektiv erforderlich ist. 2. Sie müssen aus dem, was objektiv erforderlich ist, für sich selbst eine Richtschnur gewinnen. 3. Sie müssen sich dieser Richtschnur zuverlässig und dauerhaft unterwerfen. Die Bereitschaft dazu fehlt, wenn wir der Diagnose von Ingolfur Blühdorn folgen, heute zusehends fast vollständig: "Die vorherrschenden Vorstellungen von Subjektivität und Selbstbestimmung werden zunehmend in Richtung individueller Selbstverwirklichung aktualisiert" (251). "Jede Form der Verpflichtung auf konsistente Prinzipien wird zu unzumutbaren Einschränkung und Belastung" (293).

Für Blühdorn steht Kants Vorstellung von Aufklärung am Anfang einer dialektischen Entwicklung, an deren Ende das Erforderliche ungetan bleibt (vgl. 283-288). Im Vortrag soll daher auf den Anfang, auf Kants Aufklärungsaufsatz, zurückgegangen werden: "Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit" (8:35). In diesem Rückgang zeigt sich schnell, 1. wie eng Kants Vorstellung von Aufklärung ist – nämlich zuallererst auf Religionsdinge bezogen – und 2. wie sehr sie temporal – sowohl im Moment ihrer Durchsetzung als auch in dem, was durchgesetzt wird, – bestimmt ist. Die Durchsetzung wird als "Revolution" gedacht, das Durchgesetzte als "Denkungsart" und "Charakter". Eine Rückkehr zu den Überzeugungen Kants wird nicht möglich sein. In dem Vortrag geht es zumindest darum, die – temporal definierten – innersubjektiven Korrelate zu dem – gleichfalls temporal definierten – objektiv erforderlichen Verhalten herauszupräparieren, um so die Frage nach ihren möglichen Substituten vorzubereiten.

Keywords: Enlightenment, Charakter, Climate change, Denkungsart, Vernunft.

Reconciling Intellectual Autonomy and Expert Authority

The increasing body of knowledge and the inevitability of subject specialization highlight the importance of experts and expertise, which in turn create an epistemic inequality between experts and non-experts. If we think about a specific topic, of course, an expert's opinion on that topic is much more reliable than that of a layman, and it is naturally expected from a layperson to be subject to what the expert says.

Nevertheless, the relationship between expert and layman is not that simple, the epistemic inequality between them is a serious problem that needs to be addressed. The more specialized the fields, the greater the epistemic distance between experts and laypeople. This distance leads a serious tension between our democratic ideals and epistemic norms. In a democratic society everyone has a right to have and express their own opinion, however, from the epistemic perspective experts' opinions should be followed by lay people. Can these two sides be reconciled? How can authority of experts be conjoined with the autonomy of individuals? I argue that epistemic autonomy and epistemic authority are not in conflict if properly understood. Kant has much to say to relieve this tension between them by providing a different framework both for the concept of autonomy and expert's testimony.

It may seem counter-intuitive to bring Kant for a solution to this problem as he is famous with his motto of Enlightenment. Accordingly, he encourages people to think for themselves and use their own reason. And he is generally blamed for being individualistic (Hardwig, 1985; Schmitt, 1987) and promoting distrust to experts (Grundman, forthcoming). According to Grundmann (2021: 136), Kant here appears to blame people for relying on experts rather than thinking for themselves.

However, in this paper, I argue that this individualistic reception of Kant stems from mis-reception of his views on testimony and his idea of autonomy. To advance a Kantian solution to this question, I will respectively look at Kant's view on testimony and autonomous status of the person as an ideal member of a democratic society. In the first part, I will try to determine the epistemic status of testimony-based beliefs in Kant, as we rely on expert's testimony as a source of knowledge. Second, I will investigate Kant's concept of autonomy to examine closely our Enlightenment ideals in Kantian sense. When both the epistemic status of experts' testimony and the concept of autonomy are evaluated from a Kantian perspective, it will help us to understand how an autonomous person adjust her beliefs in light of the testimony of those who are in a better epistemic position than herself without giving up or being in conflict with her autonomy, and hopefully the apparent conflict between expert and layman will be resolved.

Keywords: Autonomy, Testimony, Expertise, Enlightenment, (Epistemic) Authority

An Abductive Solution to the Problem of False Positives

Immanuel Kant posits that our knowledge of our freedom is based on our awareness of the Categorical Imperative and on the reciprocal implication between the former and the latter. However, for the Reciprocity Thesis to be plausible, it is crucial that the Categorical Imperative, as Kant presents it, is a credible candidate for a proposition from which all moral demands can be derived. But various challenges in applying the Categorical Imperative raise doubts about its candidacy. A particularly intricate and extensively debated issue is that of “false positives”—i.e., of maxims according to which it is obviously impermissible to act although the Categorical Imperative seems to imply the opposite. Apparently, this is due to morally irrelevant details in such maxims, which prevent them from leading to contradictions upon universalization (Wood 1999, 102–7; Henning 2016, 118–31; O’Neill 1989, 83–104; Korsgaard 1996, 77–105; Allison 2011, 190–203; Sensen 2014; Nyholm 2015, 25–69; McCarty 2015; Cholbi 2016, 151–60; Bojanowski 2017).

Many existing solutions have arguably been unsatisfactory (Timmons 2017b, 97–8; 2017a; O’Neill 2013, 60–110; 1989, 84; Bittner 1974; Höffe 1977; Schwartz 2006; Timmermann 2000, 44–5; Allison 2011; Henning 2016, 120–1). I propose a novel solution to the problem of false positives, along the following lines:

Maxims are premises in practical reasoning. On the plausible assumption that the conclusion of a practical inference concerns reasons to perform an action, maxims thus serve as explanations for having such reasons. More precisely, one could assume that a practical syllogism schematically has as its first premise that a particular action is the sole means to maximize the agent’s ends and, secondly, that if this first premise is the case, the agent has a reason to perform the action. The question I want to raise is, how does one come to know such premises of practical reasoning? Since they are explanations, it is reasonable to assume that knowledge of maxims can be obtained only through inferences to the best explanation of why one has reason to perform a certain action. And, therefore, because an explanation is better the more universal it is, one can only know the most universal formulations of maxims.

Given this background, the Categorical Imperative can be understood as the demand that it is possible to know the premises of one’s practical reasoning—and not merely to believe them. Consequently, the Categorical Imperative requires to possibly will that one’s maxim become a universal law because only the most general maxims are the best explanations of actions one can know of.

This solves the problem of false positives. For there is a unique universal formulation of the second premise of practical reasoning according to the mentioned schema: Necessarily, for every action, every end, and every agent, if the action is the sole means to maximize the agent’s end, then the agent has a reason to perform the action to achieve the end. From this maximally universal formulation of the second premise, all the demands of the Categorical Imperative can be derived, simultaneously resolving the problem of false positives in an elegant manner—since the premise must always be so broadly formulated that no details whatsoever play a role in it. Thereby, this solution can contribute to defending the Categorical Imperative as an indeed plausible candidate for the moral law.

Keywords: categorical imperative, false positives, maxims, universalization, universal formula

Kant's philosophical presupposition of universalism

In this paper, I argue that, notwithstanding the many criticisms it still receives today, it is Kant's philosophical universalism that will increasingly remain influential for future philosophies.

According to widely shared views, 'universalism' characterizes both Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy. In the theoretical realm, Kant's universalism comes down to the fact that he takes the basic functions of the mind that allow for the thought of an object as such to be the same for every human being. Kant's practical philosophy is said to embrace universalism because (1) all human beings find in themselves the moral law, and (2) whether an act is moral does not depend on the individual history of the subject.

Both forms of universalism have been met with criticism. Concerning Kant's theoretical philosophy, it has been stated that the 12 functions of synthesis that Kant distinguishes cannot be detached from certain grammatical structures that are typically shared by European languages. Hence, it can be doubted whether they also determine the thought processes of every human being (Gloy 2016). Concerning Kant's practical philosophy, many have pointed to the paradox that the proclaimed universality does not withhold Kant from excluding some human beings – those who apparently display lesser forms of rationality – from the possibility to act morally.

I argue, however, that the proclaimed antagonism between universality and particularity is misguided, because Kant's philosophical use of universalism is both necessary and non-descriptive. I.e., the idea of a "general" man, a "man without properties" is a necessary presupposition of any philosophy that should serve mankind. While contemporary philosophy has been much focused on conceiving of and thinking particularity, it is the philosophical presupposition of universality that will remain significant for future philosophical endeavors, as well as for any worldview that deserves to be called such.

Private Wrongs and the Blind Spots of Kantian Right

Kantian republicanism continues to exert a significant influence in ongoing debates about freedom and domination in contemporary politics. With some exceptions, most of the critical literature on Kant's legal philosophy in Anglophone political philosophy has focused on the domain of public right and issues of generalized political justice/injustice (Basevich 2022; McKean 2019; Mills 2017; Cordelli 2018; Forst 2013 & 2024). Critics have given less attention to the domain of private right and to the persisting problem of private wrongs in Kant's Rechtslehre. Rather than taking aim against the Kantian account of public right, which lends itself to more robust distributive arrangements than many critics care to acknowledge, I suggest in this presentation that the real Achilles heel of Kantian legal philosophy lies in its problematic account of private right. More specifically, I argue that Kantian legal philosophy is conceptually blind to the persisting structural wrong of labour domination by capital, which originates within the bounds of private right and results in the perpetuation of a 'semi-private wrong' that demands redress that Kantian legal philosophy is characteristically ill-suited to provide on its own conceptual grounds. I refer to the structural domination of labour as a 'semi' or 'quasi' private wrong because while it originates and proliferates within the ambit of private right, it cannot easily be traced back to a specific employer, legal person, or party to a contract because the domination and corresponding wrong is characteristically structural and impersonal. Kantian right cannot redress the 'semi-private' wrong because its conceptual purview requires that a private wrong be traced back to the actions of a recognizable legal person, ideally in a court of law. After considering relevant objections, I argue that none of the solutions proposed by contemporary Kantian legal theorists of the 'Toronto School' (Weinrib 2022; Benson 2019; Ripstein 2016) addresses the problem of labour domination as a semi-private wrong. This theoretical weakness also has important implications for more recent attempts at 'radicalizing' Kantian republicanism with the goal of condemning labour domination under capitalist production as a wrong (Forst 2024; Vrousalis 2022; Love 2017; Wood 2017). While I do not deny the plausibility of critically reconstructing Kant's conception of private right to condemn structural forms of domination and injustice, such critical reconstructions of Kant are usually compelled to turn back to Kant's account of public right and the broader prism of distributive justice, as opposed to private right and corrective justice, to condemn forms of 'generalized injustice' that obtain when Kant's account of citizenship is not made more consistent with the 'innate right' of persons. In the end, theoretical redress must be sought beyond the blind spots of Kantian (private) right.

Keywords: Private Wrongs, Kantian republicanism, Exploitation, Domination, Capitalism.

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Dorothea Christiane Erxleben and the Formation of Gender Prejudices: A New (Kantian) Model of Female Agency?

This paper aims to focus on the intellectual figure of Dorothea Christiane Erxleben, the first female doctor operating in the mid-eighteenth century in Germany, and her treatise, *Rigorous Investigation of the Causes that Obstruct the Female Sex from Study* (1742), understanding as 1. a fundamental contribution for modern "proto-feminist" thought 2. a dissertation on the concept of education of female gender, to which the ideas of prejudice and *Bestimmung* (determination, vocation of humanity) are connected 3. a reflection on the "specific" form of female reason from an epistemological point of view, in connection to Kantian position on autonomy.

In a period in which the intellectual works of women in the history of modern philosophy are generating unprecedented scholarly interest, the contributions of women in the German-speaking countries of Europe have received relatively less attention [Ebbesmeyer, 2020; Dyck, 2021]. Starting from the *Gründliche Untersuchungen*, what I will try to show is that, beyond her connection with the cultural tradition of Halle and pietistic thought, Erxleben's revolution is based above all on a valorization of the medical thought of Stahl [Poeter, 2008] and on the metaphysics of Thomasius, which accord her to the German heritage of the time. Her attention on the relationship between emotions and reason and between body and mind in women and men, inside an "ethical cure" paradigm of education, qualifies Erxleben's reflection as a functional contribution to the 1. extension of the Kantian concept of an "inclusive" autonomy and the 2. contemporary epistemological debate on the female brain (and its possible neurosexist "objectification") and gender stereotypes [Fine, 2010].

In this direction, I will articulate my paper in these following sections: the first part will be dedicated to the intellectual reconstruction of Erxleben's work within the medical and philosophical culture of the time, giving particular attention to the dimension of the body and the female mind within the *Querelle des Femmes*. Then, I will present some points of Erxleben's argumentation on which gender prejudices are based, such as the different connection between reason and emotion in men and women, the distinct relationship between mind and body, and the consequences that these dualisms have marked in the education of both, underlining how the "deviations" of female reason must be explained as the consequences of poor social and material conditions and as the denial of the real functioning of women's mind. Following some cultural innovations of Pietistic tradition, I will explain how Erxleben overcomes the theological beliefs that subordinated women within a natural hierarchical order, prohibiting their access to schooling and education, thus trying to revolutionize the concept of the "(human) nature of women" and questioning the notion of rationality and objective and conceptual knowledge, through Descartes and, above all, C. Thomasius. Compared to Thomasius, I will qualify Erxleben's text as an expansion of the *Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre*, that is, a study on the concept of female reason, in the direction of a criticism of the model of traditional rationality based on the *praejudicium autoritatis*. Starting from this comparison with the doctrine of prejudices and the relation between logical and affective ambits, I will explain how Erxleben articulates her progressive educational proposal, analyzing the common opinion that women are conceived as emotionally weak and completely devoid of basic epistemological skills, reflecting on these first gender stereotypes also starting from Kantian Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of view.

Keywords: Immanuel Kant, Dorothea Erxleben, gender, reason, prejudice

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Beyond Jusnaturalism and Juspositivism: A Kantian Constructivist Conception of Universality

Universality is one of the most central themes in the philosophical debate on human rights. The standard definition of human rights in the UDHR insists precisely that they cannot be granted or revoked because they are universal and inalienable. However, this definition immediately runs up against some notable objections that can be enclosed in the macro group often referred to as human rights relativism. This issue is closely related to the dual nature of human rights, its inherent tension between positive entitlements and moral prescriptions, that found expression in the long-standing debate between jusnaturalism and juspositivism. I will argue that this division is based on a misinterpretation of the concept of universality and that the concept of natural law itself is likely to be counterproductive to the human rights debate. I will show how certain intuitions derived from Kantian philosophy, particularly through a constructivist lens, offer a valuable solution to the universalism-relativism debate. Rights are constructed by human beings, not arbitrarily, but through a reasoned procedure: it is through this process that universality is achieved, rather than relying on pre-existing value systems inherent in the world.

Keywords: Human rights, Philosophy of action, Kantian constructivism, Natural law, Juridical positivism

Kant and Hegel: on the transcendent unity of apperception reconsidered

The transcendental deduction of the categories, and, equally, the Kantian doctrine of the transcendental unity of apperception, has been widely recognized as an overriding thread for understanding the development of German Idealism in the figures of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. In his influential monograph of 89' Robert Pippin interprets much of Hegel's philosophy in the light of such an argument. In the first part of the book Pippin reconstructs the argument of the first section of the *Phenomenology* as constituting a proof in favor of the Kantian thesis according to which the unity of self-consciousness requires the contribution of specifically non-empirical concepts. In the second part, this perspective is enriched; the *Logic*, understood as an endeavor of thinking that thinks thinking, is only intelligible at the expository or methodical level against the background provided by the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. Pippin has recently complemented this "from Kant to Hegel" approach in his *Hegel's Realm of Shadows*, this time exploiting motifs from the third Critique to outline and understand different positions underpinned by Hegel in his *Logic*. However, both works share a tacit assumption, which is also replicated by other prominent interpreters of German Idealism: the transcendental unity of apperception means in both philosophers basically the same phenomenon. One such interpreter is Robert Brandom. According to Brandom the transcendental unity of apperception would mean for Kant a prescription that every judgment would have to fulfill: each one must be materially compatible with the previously adopted judgments. This implies that the relata whose unification makes transcendental unity possible are judgments. But this position blurs the original Kantian doctrine according to which the synthesis that makes possible the non-empirical unity of consciousness takes for relata intuitions, i.e. representations, not judgments. I will suggest that the position is more in line with Hegel's understanding of this unity. To that extent the synthesis that would serve as a correlate for the transcendental unity of apperception would have for locus the syllogism, or inference, and not judgment. Thus, the Hegelian doctrine of apperception claims contributions that according to Kant are proper to reason and reflective judgment, contributions that enable the systematization of empirical knowledge into more omnibarcarative unities. If this is true, the positions sketched by Hegel in *Glauben und Wissen* find a natural interpretation: the unity of pure self-consciousness and intuitive understanding mean both, in a correctly understood sense, one and the same idea. Naturally, this reformed understanding of the Kantian doctrine requires exploring both interpretative tendencies tested by Pippin, but also, weaving them together -something that Pippin himself does not do. In this paper I will offer some guidelines for understanding the Hegelian doctrine of apperception by restricting myself to the first section of the "Doctrine of the Concept" and attempting to trace the respective connections with the Kantian antecedents discussed above. In particular, I will concentrate on three parts of the first section of the "Subjective Logic", the proem, the overcoming of judgment by syllogism, and the transition from syllogism to objectivity.

Keywords: apperception - judgment - Hegel - Kant - syllogism

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Personal Autonomy in Kant's Ethical Thought

Modern personal autonomy (PA), it is generally assumed, doesn't occupy an important place in Kant's ethical thought, if at all. Contrary to this widespread notion, I will argue that its role could not be more prominent. To accomplish this, I will first outline the meaning of the term. Next, I will analyze Waldron's query regarding whether PA aligns well with Kantian considerations on the pursuit of happiness. Thirdly, I will review Taylor's thesis that a properly Kantian PA must be located within the space of latitude left by the imperfect duties of the Doctrine of Virtue. I will then go on to defend my thesis: the entire Kantian moral philosophy, i.e., both the first principle and the duties derived from it, can be thought of as a normative framework oriented toward safeguarding and fostering PA. This assertion stems from its inherent connection to the concept of humanity (the ability to set ends for oneself, both moral and non-moral), contained in the second formula of the categorical imperative.

Keywords: personal autonomy; humanity; happiness; doctrine of virtue; Kantian morality

An interpretation of what it means that non-human-beings can be ends in themselves for human agents

Undoubtedly, the Kantian idea of the moral value of those who are ends in themselves has significantly influenced on ecological ethics. Theorists have put forward various proposals to justify why certain classes of beings are ends in themselves, based on certain capacities or properties of these beings¹. However, these proposals suffer from the problem of lacking autonomous normative force: Many of the proposed reasons assume that since a subject has its own ends (based on some property), human agents should respect them. However, there is a normative gap between the recognition that something has ends and the command to act morally (Moellendorf 2014). Moreover, the proposed sources of the normativity of morality are not autonomous (from reason) but based on something external (a property of another being that command us).

To address this problem, I propose that what makes something valued as an end in itself is not a specific property (i.e., moral value does not reside in it), but the reasons and attitudes that agents have toward that being (i.e., moral value is based on the valuation of human agents). If agents have reasons to adopt an unconditional, continuous, and asymmetrical attitude of self-regulating their own actions and focusing on what happens to the other, then this other (animal, plant, ecosystem, or non-living being) is an end in itself.

According to Wood, Kant's moral theory is based "neither in a principle to be obeyed nor in an end to be pursued, but in a value to be esteemed, honoured or respected" (1998, 196). What does it mean to be a value in the moral sense? I propose, drawing on Scanlon's (1998) and Anderson's (1995) ideas about value, that something is morally valuable if agents have reasons to adopt a favorable attitude toward it, which focuses on the other and on self-limiting action based on it. Thus, the reasons for such an attitude are the following: (a) the other is vulnerable to the agent's actions, (b) the agent has the capacity to limit or self-constrain their actions and to adopt certain other-centered attitudes, (c) the other has certain properties (as mentioned in footnote 1 and not necessarily just one specific property) that the agent can identify that require an appropriate response (attitude) on their part. Reasons for action do not necessarily come from Reason (Forst 2018, 298). However, human agents do possess Reason, which "(...) is the faculty by which reasons are tested, questioned, and evaluated (...)" (Forst 2021, 47). So, as rational beings, agents should evaluate these reasons.

If, for a given nonhuman, agents cannot reasonably reject these reasons (Scanlon 1998) for this kind of attitude, and if this attitude can be maintained unconditionally, continuously, and asymmetrically, then this attitude is rational required, and this given nonhuman is an end in itself. As beings with practical reason, these reasons autonomously lead us to recognize the necessity of adopting a moral attitude toward a nonhuman being. There is no normative force other than practical reason itself. Morality has a human origin (anthropogenetic) but is not necessarily anthropocentric.

Keywords: End in itself, nonhumans, moral value, ecological ethics, moral attitudes

Man and history in Immanuel Kant (with some reference to Nicolai Hartmann's interpretation)

Kant's reflections on human nature in history and the meaning of social change can be found in his "minor" writings. But important consequences can also be derived from his great Critiques. My task is (1) to outline Kant's main theses in the area of the understanding of the social nature of man and its historical transformations; (2) to analyse these theses by examining their immanent coherence; (3) to situate Kant's conception in the background of three models of the philosophy of history (theoretical model, practical model, theoretical-practical model); (4) to analyse the relevance of Kant's considerations for the contemporary possible philosophy of history (in the context of contemporary challenges). I also consider the perspective of interpretation offered by Nicolai Hartmann (especially in his article *Sinnggebung und Sinnerfüllung*).

I demonstrate that the value of Kant's "social" considerations lies primarily in showing the possible combination of 'objective' regularities (determined by man's "asocial sociality") and 'subjective' regularities (determined by man as a free moral subject). In Kant's perspective, it is also possible to combine a legal society with a moral society. I therefore interpret Kant as the founder of the practical model (in the social philosophy and philosophy of history).

With reference to Nicolai Hartmann's interpretation, I show that the importance of Kant's philosophy also lies in the fact that it is an important element in the formation of a new understanding of meaning - both the individual meaning of human life and the social and historical meaning. The result of this process is the idea that man is the being who makes sense, both of himself and of the social and historical world.

I also outline the main theoretical problems facing Kant's social philosophy that can be expressed in the form of a kind of antinomy. If we want to affirm a social moral progress in history, the consequence is that we must either deny it a moral character or deny it a truly historical character. In the first case, it is a question of an instrumental relation to other generations; in the second, it is a question of the discontinuity of personal and moral life. It seems that in Kant both requirements cannot be satisfied at the same time.

Apart from these immanent problems, Kant's social philosophy contains several elements that are important for the later and contemporary understanding of the aims and tasks of social philosophy and philosophy of history. In my view, this importance can be summarised as follows. The aim of social philosophy and philosophy of history is to show that there are possible valuable scenarios that can be realised - but only if man consciously takes them up as his task. This is also what Kant's 'Enlightenment' is about. This is also the essence of the practical model that Kant has created (in the philosophy of society and in the philosophy of history).

Keywords: practical model, moral and social progress, legality, asocial sociality, human nature

Kant's thoughts on Imagination and Human Autonomy: Rejecting narrowing ideas of creativity

Today, one may paradoxically sit both bright-eyed and grim-faced while looking towards the horizon of a future that promises utopia and threatens dystopia with equal solemnity. These promises and threats appeal to creative mechanisms. But the idea of creative mechanisms has been long thought an oxymoron. Rather, mechanisms are developed and used by creative minds (e.g., Chomsky, 1966; Descartes, 1637; W. von Humboldt, 1836; Kant, 1781/87). On reflection, one may well reach the preliminary conclusion that a reliance on mechanistic solutions might not be such a good idea. And an informed person with a predilection for placing a bet would back a dystopian outcome over a utopian one, since it seems likely that under the continuing AI revolution the creative mind will become imprisoned by its own tools (e.g., Wach et al, 2023). Such dire conclusions encourages one to think of Kant's words which serve as a timely reminder of the importance of human autonomy and act as a call to remember that most readily found in the species is an unrelenting desire to create. The imagination, Kant says,

is very mighty when it creates ... another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it ... [in such instances] we feel our freedom ... [and] turn that material into something quite different ... something that surpasses nature. (Critique of the Power of Judgement, V: 314)

Yet, the climate of opinion dismisses Kant. Cognitive scientist Arthur Miller enthusiastically suggests machines are the way forward since humans are not 'imaginative' but only reproductive (The Guardian, 4th March, 2019). Such a pitiful assessment of humanity, says Miller, should not stop us celebrating AI and the bright new future it promises. In reaction to what seems like an extraordinary leap of faith this paper suggests we pause for thought. We should define 'creativity,' by establishing the principles of creativity and how creative acts happen (e.g., Chomsky, 1986; Gatys, 2019, cf. B.F. Skinner, 1957, 1973). These questions related to humans alone are challenging. The gap between theories of formal mechanisms and what the mind can create, what the great Kantian linguist Wilhelm von Humboldt described as "infinite use of finite means" (1999, p. 91) persists (Chomsky, 1986; Goodman, 2015; Quilty-Dunn et al, 2023) and is bridged by vague terms like 'engendering' (e.g., Chomsky, 1966). Yet, AI discussions bundle the terms 'productivity' 'generativity' and 'creativity' together (cf. Buckner, 2024) even though it has been long explained that these terms are not synonymous (e.g., Chomsky, 1968) and much of what was written in the vein of 'classical liberalism' understood this insight (e.g., Kant, 1781/87; W. von Humboldt, 1836). In sum, if eye-catching headlines like Miller's are believed, then much will be lost. Our understanding of imagination, creativity, autonomy and freedom will narrow since they will become synonymous with productivity, threatening human autonomy to the point of extinction.


Keywords: Kant, Autonomy, Imagination, Creativity, AI

Kant's justification of the rationality of inquiry

For Kant, reason is the highest cognitive faculty. It is the faculty that transforms “rhapsodies” of cognitions into the systematic cognitions that constitute science (“Wissenschaft”; A832-3/B860-1)—a systematic form of knowledge (“Wissen”). Despite this nominal role, it is not sufficiently clear how reason can make a valuable cognitive contribution. Typically, knowledge requires justification—the latter being what distinguishes knowledge from (accidentally true) belief. However, it is difficult to justify the rational method by which we obtain systematic cognitions in Kant's account. Without such a justification, reason cannot be said to lead us to scientific knowledge. This result is exegetically costly and threatens the rationality of inquiry, since systematic cognitions would be indistinguishable from accidentally true beliefs.

In this paper, I aim to (1) analyse the problem of justification of the rationality of inquiry in Kant, (2) discuss three possible approaches to it, and (3) propose an alternative solution.

1. Epistemologists distinguish between different orders of justification: (i) justification of beliefs; and (ii) justification of methods (Schurz 2021). I suggest that these two orders of justification can be found in Kant's discussion of reason, as illustrated below (see also Allison 2004):



Kant identifies the rational method by which we infer systematic cognitions in the logical maxim of reason (LM): “to find the unconditioned for conditioned cognitions of the understanding, with which its unity will be completed” (A307/B364). I contend that LM requires justification when it is applied to objects (LMo).

1. How is LMo justified? In this paper, I consider three possible answers to this question: (1) dogmatism; (2) coherentism; (3) doctrinal belief in the unconditioned (Schafer 2023). I argue that neither of these approaches succeeds in justifying the principle. What characterizes all these solutions is that they attempt to justify LMo at the object level, i.e. they try to show that this maxim is reliable. But this is an ill-fated attempt. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate that a cognitive method is reliable.
2. I contend that Kant has a more modest justification strategy to offer. LMo is justified not as a reliable method, but as the best and only method for achieving an epistemic goal (systematic unity), regardless of how the world turns out to be. Since it is rational to act according to the strategy that maximizes one's epistemic goal, we are justified in following LMo.

The proposed solution offers a natural reading of the puzzling transcendental deduction of the ideas of reason that Kant presents as the “completion” of the Critique of Pure Reason (A669–70/B697–8). It may be objected, however, that by grounding the justification of reason in the fulfilment of a goal, this solution cuts the link between truth and justification. I reply that following LMo is not just instrumentally necessary but is what essentially constitutes us as rational inquirers. To be a rational inquirer is to follow LMo, and to follow LMo is to seek for true conditioning relations between objects.

Keywords: rationality, knowledge, science, justification, inquiry

Kant and Bourdieu on Character, Habitus, and the Possibility of Freedom

In the past decades, we have witnessed a revival in realism in moral and political theory, which defines itself through a stark opposition to Kant and 'neo-Kantian' thinkers such as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas (cf. Williams 1985: 17-18, 62-3, 100-4, 193-4; 2005; Geuss 2007, 2008; Hamilton 2003: 10-4). According to realists, Kant's and his followers' approaches to ethics and politics are insensitive to concrete historical dynamics, idealized, overly rationalistic, and moralistic.

It is far from clear, however, that Kant's practical philosophy is so flatly opposed to a realistic take on politics and ethics, as realists surmise. In my paper, I argue that the account of practice proposed by a realist social scientist such as Pierre Bourdieu can benefit from a dialogue with Kant's practical philosophy and that the latter can also profit from such a dialogue. I claim that Bourdieu's theory of habitus can be purged of its deterministic and utilitarian implications by being integrated into a Kantian account of human faculties, while Kant's theory of character can be made more sensitive to the social constraints to action by complementing it with Bourdieu's theory of habitus.

My paper has three sections. First, I set out Bourdieu's realistic and dispositional theory of practice. In his view, human agency is based on habitus, i.e., a set of cognitive and evaluative dispositions that are shaped by socioeconomic and cultural factors (Bourdieu 1980: 87-109). Many critics have objected that the theory of habitus seems to entail that no free moral action is possible since agents would not be able to determine themselves independently of given socioeconomic conditions and would not be able to act on motives other than self-aggrandizement (Honneth 1986; Alexander 1995: 129-36, 155; Sayer 2005: 3, 98-101, 110-1).

Second, I argue that this objection can be met by considering habitus not the sufficient condition of human practice, but only a necessary one. The dispositions that constitute habitus are the historically determinate form acquired by human faculties that can be exercised also independently of the social conditions in which they are individually instantiated. In this sense, habitus does not rule out moral self-determination but pinpoints the social obstacles that may obstruct it. Accordingly, I claim that Bourdieu's theory of habitus can be seen as the sociological layer of a practical philosophy of Kantian inspiration. Indeed, in the *Anthropology*, Kant presents human faculties in terms of dispositions (Cohen 2009: 23-9; 71-4). Moreover, drawing on Kant is justified by Bourdieu's recurrent appeals to Kant's rationalism and universalism (Bourdieu 1992: 239-244; 2003 [1997]: 174 ff.).

Third, I argue that Bourdieu's theory of habitus can be used to complement Kant's account of character, particularly as far as natural character (*Sinnesart*; AA VII: 291-2) is concerned. I claim that, if Bourdieu's theory of habitus can be considered a layer of a broader framework of faculties (as in Kant's *anthropology*; cf. Sturm 2009: 391-4), then habitus can account for "what society does with the human being" (as opposed to what "nature does with the human being"). Thus, Kant's practical philosophy can be rendered more concrete by complementing it with a sociological view of human practice.

Keywords: Kant, Bourdieu, practical philosophy, human sciences, character.

Green Cultural Transition in a Kantian Vein

Given the drastic changes requested by the Green Transition, people affected directly and indirectly might perceive the process as an overdemanding task. From an economic perspective, citizens might be deeply sceptical about the redistributive costs of financing climate policies and technological innovations, particularly in highly unequal societies. However, the burdens are not only material. From a cultural perspective, people may also perceive as illegitimate using institutional authority to prohibit and put external obstacles to their non-sustainable practices (e.g. prohibiting taking flights when trains are available) and/or to promote green values positively (e.g., encouraging people to reevaluate their relationship to the nature and thinking green). The paper is particularly interested in such cultural burdens. When do people have sound reasons to say that their scope of freedom is being illegitimately restricted when institutions impose a change of life style and impact their cultural identities? How can political institutions help to promote green virtues among citizens? Building on a recent wave of Kant scholarship devoted to climate change, but moving beyond the suggestions so far received, the paper attempts to unearth the most promising Kantian resources to answer the question of the legitimacy of state coercion for meeting green objectives and the question of how and why people can be asked and expected to change their life style (over and above coercion) to align to the green transition.

Keywords: Green Transition, Climate Change, Cultural Burdens, Kant.

Two Faces of Politics in Kant's Aesthetics

Immanuel Kant redefined the boundaries of human thought with his critical philosophy, yet its impact on political thinking has been insufficiently discussed by both Kant himself and subsequent scholars. Most interpreters of Kant's political thought have concentrated mainly on Kant's few political treatises as if they were the core of his political philosophy but have ignored the question of the place of politics in his critical philosophy. A notable exception is Hannah Arendt, who contends that Kant's Critique of Judgment is the nearest equivalent to a political critique that Kant never wrote. The paper aims to extend Arendt's interpretation of Kant's political thought in Kant's aesthetics by reconstructing implications of two possible conceptualisation politics based on Kant's aesthetics of beautiful and sublime.

I argue that Arendt rightly discovers the possibility of conceptualization of politics in Kant's aesthetics of the beautiful, but Arendt has been unsuccessful in avoiding anthropologized interpretation of *sensus communis*. To avoid anthropologized interpretation of Kant's aesthetics of the beautiful, I claim that an a priori definition of politics could be grounded in Kant's notion of aesthetic ideas. While Arendt also fails to define politics in Kant's critical system, identification of politics with aesthetic ideas allows at least a negative definition of politics. Grounded in aesthetic ideas, politics is defined as necessarily lacking an objective definition, while being constantly shaped and reshaped by reflective judgement via symbolic representation. Nonetheless, Arendt's interpretation only explores the political implications of Kant's aesthetics of the beautiful, while completely ignoring the political implications of the aesthetics of the sublime.

One way the implication of Kant's aesthetics of sublime to politics can be traced is by analysing Carl Schmitt's concept of the political. Whereas Schmitt's political thought has received conflicting interpretations over its relationship with aesthetics, I argue that Kant's aesthetics of the sublime allows to clear these debates by reinterpretation of the concept of the political in the light of Kant's aesthetics of the sublime. Although it could seem that Schmitt's concept of the political opposes any attempts at aestheticization of politics, Schmitt opposes a particular notion of aesthetics of the beautiful. By employing Jean-François Lyotard's interpretations of Kant's notion of the sublime, the political (irreducible grouping alongside public friends and enemies) could be perceived as 'formless matter' ('*differend*' in Lyotard's terms) negatively presenting the incapacity to present the idea of reason within the experience. In other words, Schmitt's concept of political signifies the very impossibility of attaining the realization of the idea of reason in experience. Moreover, Schmitt's argument against the very political idea of humanity is not contrary to Kant's critical philosophy but follows from Kant's aesthetic of the sublime whose political implications Kant himself could not anticipate in his political writings.

Keywords: Kant's aesthetics, Hannah Arendt, Carl Schmitt, Sublime, Political

Aiding the impermissible? Kant and the morality of physician-administered euthanasia

It is often assumed that an important first hurdle for any defence of physician-administered euthanasia (PAE) is a demonstration of the moral permissibility of committing suicide, at least in some cases. While there is recognition in the literature that the permissibility of suicide does not strictly entail the permissibility of assisting another to kill themselves, the impermissibility of suicide does seem to rule out giving assistance. After all, we ought not aid others in performing impermissible actions. Due to this, Kant's insistence that suicide is in every instance contrary to moral duty would seem to scupper any chances of support for PAE in Kantian ethics.

The aim of this paper is to argue that Kant and Kantians have the resources to support PAE even if we hold Kant's claims about the impermissibility of suicide fixed. The primary concern raised for PAE by the impermissibility of suicide is that physicians would be aiding their patients to perform an impermissible action, and thus act wrongly themselves. However, as I show, we do not aid the violation of another's duty to self simply by acting on their consent. This is because the consent itself constitutes the violation of the duty to self. On the Kantian analysis, the duty prohibiting suicide makes consenting to being killed wrongful for the person who gives consent, but the consent is normatively transformative. Moreover, under the conditions specified below, physicians are not wrongly complicit in their patient's wrongdoing. In arguing for these claims I also suggest that the Kantian focus in discussions of PAE should not be on the duties to self of the patients, but rather on the relationship between the patient and physician.

My discussion is split into three sections. In the first, I outline a Kantian response to autonomy-based arguments for the permissibility of suicide and the problem this response raises for Kantian support for PAE. In the second section, I argue that physicians neither aid nor are necessarily complicit with the violation of their patient's duty to self by administering PAE. I use Dignitas as an example of non-complicit assisted suicide. The third section addresses two objections: i. that consenting to being killed by another is impossible on Kant's view and so physicians' duties are not waived by their patients' expressions of consent, and ii. that legalisation of PAE constitutes wrongful solicitation of violations of duties to self. I argue that both objections fail to rule out PAE in all circumstances, but do set limits to the way the practice can permissibly be implemented.

Praise of the controversy: Kant and the polemical use of reason

Kant is the philosopher who claims public space as the emblematic site of the Enlightenment: the space where ideas are communicated and scrutinized. However, he is also the one who sees the conflict between ideas, the philosophical form of which is controversy, as a sophistic deception: empty words, fallacious reasoning, instruments of persuasion unrelated to truth. As is well known, the critique of dialectical reason elaborated in the first Critique provides a broad description of the sophistic temptations of reason, the outcome of which is the "battlefield of endless controversy" (Critique of Pure Reason, A VIII) that plagues philosophical theory. The goal of criticism is to eradicate the seed of controversy to its root (CPR, B 806). The following questions then arise: is the absence of dispute compatible with the Enlightenment? Does consensus really have as a condition the overcoming of the conflict of ideas? Is it possible to conduct philosophical work neutrally, that is, without taking sides and arguing in favor of an idea? To answer these questions, I intend to examine the section on the "polemical use of reason" (CPR, B 767 ff.).

In the polemical use of reason, Kant places the dialectic in the city and no longer just in a self-reflexive exercise. The court of reason moves to the public square, where the antinomy of reason takes the form of a controversy between skeptics and dogmatists on topics of fundamental relevance to the community (religion and morality). The point is that the controversy must somehow convince an audience and that the philosopher for a moment ceases to be neutral. Polemical use is in fact the defence of the propositions of pure reason against those who deny them (CPR, B 767). In polemical use, even the critical philosopher is temporarily allowed to get into a controversy and use dialectic as a tool for the struggle of ideas. My aim is to emphasize this limited concession. So, in the first part I expose the downgrading of dialectic to a sophistic art, which results from insufficient analysis of the ideas of reason and the resulting misunderstandings that fuel controversy. In the second part, I analyze the momentary recovery of dialectic as a tool for understanding "ideology" (nature and purpose of ideas) and the admission of polemic as a moment of engagement. Public controversy exhibits the conflict between worldviews and tests the possibility of "philosophical peace" in view of common interests. Here I will mention communication ethics (Apel and Habermas) and conflict theories (Mouffe, Honneth).

Emphasising the polemical use of reason thus allows the Enlightenment Kant to be reunited with his critique of dialectical reason, to reunite the public space of ideological conflict with the art and even the passion of debating, that is, of weighing reasons and making choices. The transcendental critique of dispute should be compatible with critical dispute in front of an audience, through which we perhaps better understand which ideas to commit ourselves to.

Keywords: dialectic, controversy, ideas, conflict, public space

Appealing to the Kantian Table of Nothing to understand the current debate about nothingness

This paper appeals to the table of nothingness (Nichts) occurring within Kant's Critique of Pure Reason [1781; 1787] (1998) to assess three recent accounts of nothingness – (Priest 2014), (Costantini 2020), and (Casati & Fujikawa 2019) – under the light of folk preconceptions about nothingness. After defining the two strongest preconceptions as the absence of unrestrictedly everything (nihil absolutum) and the idea of nothingness as a self-contradictory item (nihil negativum), I argue that both might be read as two Aristotelian 'connected homonyms' (see Irwin 1981), rather than conflating them into a single item (as Priest's and Casati & Fujikawa's accounts seem to do), or dropping the idea of the nihil absolutum, as Costantini's account does.

In the introduction of my talk, I will argue that a good view of nothingness should meet at the same time three desiderata, namely:

- (i) It should account for both the core preconceptions we implicitly or explicitly have about the nominal essence of nothingness, namely, the nihil absolutum (absolute nothingness) and the nihil negativum (negative nothingness).
- (ii) Those two preconceptions should be kept distinct.
- (iii) Those two preconceptions should be related.

Then, I will recall that in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant distinguishes four different notions of nothingness, on the basis of the German scholasticism, giving rise to a 'table of nothingness' arising from his general table of categories: ens rationis; nihil privativum; ens imaginarium; nihil negativum. Here is Kant's popular table of nothingness:

- (i) Ens rationis: empty concept without an object
- (ii) Nihil privativum: empty object of a concept
- (iii) Ens imaginarium: empty intuition without an object
- (iv) Nihil negativum: empty object without a concept

I will assume that the two focal or core meanings of nothingness are nihil privativum and nihil negativum, as far as the former can be extended to accommodate the notion of nihil absolutum. Then, I will show which might be the (logical) relation between the nihil absolutum and the nihil negativum. Finally, through the lens of this relation, I will evaluate and criticize three recent accounts of nothingness (Priest 2014; Costantini 2020, and Casati & Fujikawa 2019), showing why they do not seem to properly account for the nominal essence of nothingness.

Keywords: Nothingness; Kant's table of nothing; Aristotle's homonymy; negative nothingness; absolute nothingness.

Kant's Metaphysics of the Non-Existent

This paper expounds Kant's metaphysics of the non-existent. Although orthodoxy has it that Kant only countenances existent objects (Stang 2016), recent literature contains compelling cases in favor of attributing an ontology of non-existent objects to Kant. (Vanzo 2014; Rosefeldt 2020) However, the constitution of these objects has not been thoroughly investigated to date. This is unfortunate as Kant's position has the potential to influence future debates by avoiding two unattractive extremes.

The first extreme denies that there are non-existent entities at all. This position is unattractive because non-existent entities play crucial roles in areas as diverse as causation (Schaffer 2004), perception (Farennikova 2013), and intentionality (Priest 2005). Such considerations may motivate an uncritical acceptance of non-existent entities on a par with existent entities. However, this second extreme faces serious challenges regarding the intelligibility of its metaphysics. (Della Rocca 2020, Mumford 2021) Kant avoids these two extremes by countenancing non-existent objects that are dependent on human cognitive capacities. This allows reaping the explanatory benefits of non-existent objects within the confines of a palpable metaphysics.

To establish the dependency of Kantian non-existent objects on human cognitive capacities, Kant's only systematization of the non-existent in the 'Table of Nothing' will be investigated. There, Kant divides objects into two basic categories: Something and Nothing. Which of these objects does Kant take to have being?

Some things are objects thought of, and partly constituted, by means of the categories and forms of sensibility. (CpR: A290/B346) The only non-existent Something is a merely possible object. Kant accepts an ontology of possibilita: he states that we can legitimately ask "about this object whether it is merely possible" and that the categories and space apply to "possible things." (CpR: A219/B266, A221/B268) Moreover, because it is constitutive of possibilita to conform to the forms of sensibility and the understanding, their properties depend on human cognitive capacities. (CpR: A220/B267)

Nothings stand in opposition to the categories. (CpR: A290/B346) As such, they depend on a part of the human cognitive capacities: the understanding. That is because they are construed as opposites of categories, and because negations are dependent on their corresponding realities. (CpR: A574-5/B602-3)

Does Kant take Nothings to have being, too? Kant makes clear that only entia rationum and entia imaginaria are beings. First, Kant claims that an ens rationis (e.g., God) is a "thought-entity" whereas a nihil negativum (e.g., 'object' of a contradictory concept) is a "non-entity." (CpR: A292/B348) Second, Kant claims that a nihil privativum (e.g., a shadow) represents "the absence of an object," whereas an ens imaginarium (e.g., pure space) represents "to be sure something." (CpR: A290-1/B347-8)

In sum, Kant's critical philosophy mobilizes an ontology of the non-existent comprising possibilita, entia rationum and entia imaginaria. Kant's idea of articulating their metaphysical differences in terms of patterns of dependence on human cognitive capacities makes for an inoffensive metaphysics that at the same time features a rich stock of objects which are sure to fit a variety of explanatory roles.

Keywords: nothingness, non-existent objects, metaphysics, mind-dependence

The Formula of Humanity and Strike Action

The last few years have seen an increased amount of labour disputes and strike or industrial actions in many countries as part of broader waves of discontent with the status quo. I believe that Kantian ethics can help us better understand the ethics of striking, meaning the permissions and restrictions that govern this form of social and political struggle. Specifically, I argue that we need an account of what it means to treat others almost as a mere means to decide whether specific strike actions are just and ethical.

I will focus on strike action in which workers try to exert pressure on employers or the government via disruption or harm inflicted on an innocent and powerless third party such as patients (in the health care sector) or students (the recent UK's Marking and Assessment Boycott). There is a worry that these third parties are being treated as a mere means because they are not responsible for the conditions workers are striking against, and it is not in their power to end the industrial dispute. I argue that these third parties are not in fact treated as a mere means because striking workers still observe side constraints that express respect for third parties' status as ends in themselves.

I then address the problem (raised by theorists such as Derek Parfit) that this reading of the Formula of Humanity may be underdemanding. I can act unjustly and certainly unethically whilst still respecting some (minimal) constraints. We should therefore worry not merely about treating as a mere means but also about treating almost as a mere means (respecting some constraints but not others), which is also impermissible. I will propose a number of Kantian criteria to determine whether a person is treated almost as a mere means:

- Consent: Can third-parties be brought to rationally endorse the strikers' ends?
- Separateness of persons/equity: One person or group should not bear a disproportionate burden of the strike action.
- Publicity: Strike goals themselves and the way they are communicated should be such that the public at large can understand and assess them.
- Exit option: Are there options for all involved parties to impact or even end the strike actions?

I argue that in many cases we have to balance met, unmet and partially met criteria against each other to determine whether someone is treated almost as a mere means. This balancing is in some sense unKantian, but the criteria themselves do represent core Kantian commitments. Moreover, I believe that the category of treating almost as a mere means is of great significance not only for the ethics of striking, and treating innocent and powerless third parties, but also for many other difficult and marginal ethical and political questions. Working out Kantian criteria to adjudicate difficult cases is a desideratum beyond the ethics of striking and a contribution Kantian ethics can make to many complex applied ethical and social questions.

Keywords: Formula of Humanity, treating as a mere means, side-constraints, striking, consent

Friendship as a Practice of Freedom: Simone de Beauvoir's Reception of Kant's Thought

Since the 1980s, feminist scholarship has engaged in a critical dialogue with Immanuel Kant's work (May Schott, 1997). On the one hand, scholars have highlighted the limits of his hierarchical conception of gender roles and his model of disembodied, abstract, and universal reason (Flax, 1987; Pateman, 1988; Young, 1990). On the other hand, they have shown the emancipative potential of his concepts of «autonomy», «freedom» and «respect», and their usefulness for feminist theories (Kofman, 1982; Nussbaum, 1997; Nagl-Docekal, 1997). However, this latter approach has largely overlooked the relevance of the Kantian concept of «friendship» for feminist philosophers who have made it a space for building relationships of equality, autonomy, and mutual recognition (Rumsey, 1997). This paper aims to fill this gap by arguing that the concept of «friendship» developed by Kant in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) significantly influenced Simone de Beauvoir's notion of «friendship» in *The Second Sex* (1949), where it signifies a relationship of mutual recognition between free and equal subjects. Emerging from the tension between human selfishness and the need to interact with others, in Kant's opinion, «moral friendship» is an ideal toward which agents have a duty to strive. To Kant, moral friendship is not motivated by personal interests but is founded on «equal mutual love and respect» between two equal individuals who trust each other to discuss their moral challenges without fear of undue judgment or public embarrassment (Marcucci, 1995; Sensen, 2013; Rinne, Brecher, 2023). And yet, because the participants in this kind of relationship are sensible agents who might not always be able to balance their feelings, the stability of friendship is always potentially on the brink of destruction. Thus, while Kant acknowledges that true friendship is difficult to achieve and maintain, he still considers it as a space where mutual respect allows each person to be regarded as end in themselves and to experience freedom, reaching a union of will without owning each other (Papadaki, 2010).

Simone de Beauvoir engages with Kant's thought in *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (1947), where she both questions and utilizes it. While she confronts universalism with the notion of «difference» and assesses autonomy within power relationships, like Kant she treats human freedom and autonomy as the presuppositions for morality and defends the uniqueness, value and irreducibility of each individual, proclaiming the importance of treating «each man as an end» (Heise, 1991; Lundgren-Gothil, 1997). Although Kant is rarely quoted in *The Second Sex*, the lexicon Beauvoir uses to define her conception of «friendship» reveals not only the widely studied reference to Hegel's concept of «recognition» (Altman, 2007; Green, Nicholas, 2010; Hutchings, 2017), but also references to the Kantian principles embraced in *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, along with Kant's reflections on friendship. In *The Second Sex* Beauvoir shows how historically the subject (man) has asserted itself as essential by constructing the other (woman) as the non-essential over which to exert sovereignty. In contrast, according to Beauvoir, friendship is a relationship in which both subjects can find mutual recognition. Like Kant, Beauvoir also posits that for genuine friendship to exist, the agents must be «free from one another and concretely equal». «Freedom» in friendship is guaranteed by the absence of coercion, that is by the «independence from external orders» in expressing feelings, and the mutual recognition of each other as ends and not as a means. While Beauvoir acknowledges, like Kant, the difficulty of maintaining moral friendship, especially among women because «the shadow of men always weighs upon them» triggering rivalry and jealousy, her friendships with Zaza and her sister H el ene, as depicted in *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter* (1958) and *Inseparable* (2020), suggest that it is in female friendship that being with the other provides continuity rather than disruption to being a «subject», thereby enabling the experience of freedom (Ward, 1999). Overall, therefore, through the analysis of Beauvoir's reception of the Kantian concept of friendship, this paper aims not only to fill a gap within feminist scholarship on Kant's thought, but also to inquire into the relevance of this concept for envisioning, today, emancipatory practices within human relationships.

The Idea of Populism: Kant and Democracy in the 21st Century

Kant's tercentenary falls on an historic year for democracy in which over half of the world's population will vote in national elections. This coincidence suits the liberal-democratic orientation of contemporary Kantian political theory. Yet Kant is an unusual and potentially unsatisfactory ally of democracy. At times, Kant expresses support for autocratic governance while equating democracy with despotism. Moreover, Kant defends several claims that are inconsistent with modern democratic values and sensibilities—e.g., a restricted franchise and an unconditional prohibition on revolution. It seems, then, that the prospects for Kant's philosophy to contribute to our understanding of 21st century democracy are rather grim. This is especially unfortunate given the threats to democracy that have recently (re)emerged, such as right-wing revanchism and democratic backsliding.

Despite the anti-democratic dimensions of Kant's political theory, in this paper I argue that Kant offers a unique understanding of populism, one of the most contested topics in current debates about the status of democracy. According to Kant, the criterion for the rightful exercise of public coercion is the a priori idea of the general will. In other words, for a law to legitimately constrain freedom, it ought to conform with a counterfactual norm of collective consent, according to which those subject to law can also be conceived as its possible (as opposed to actual) co-legislators. Against Rousseau, Kant separates the norm of collective self-legislation from the empirical content of the people's will discoverable through a democratic voting procedure like voting. While this seems to decisively sever Kant from populism, I propose that his idealization of the general will encodes a populist logic into his model of politics and political progress.

As Kant argues, the a priori criterion of popular sovereignty generates a duty for those in power to bring the existing state into closer conformity with the unachievable model of a perfect, fully self-legislating republic. The counterfactual status of the general will in Kant thus yields the normative claim that every state is a necessarily deficient empirical 'representation' of the idea of a completely rightful republic governed by the general will. This creates an irresolvable tension between the actual state and the idea of absolute popular sovereignty. For Kant, this antagonism is chiefly mediated by the public sphere, in which those subject to law can appeal to the standard of the general will to openly assess whether the actions of a government are legitimate. The result is that a certain kind of populist demand is constitutive of politics for Kant. Because these demands must be framed within the legal constraints of an extant regime, Kant shows how the popular will can and should be integrated into politics without inciting the extremism and illiberalism deplored by critics of populism. As Kant pointed out, the biggest threat to the stability of a state is not the people's will, but leaders who ignore or dismiss the latter. In an era of increased populist discontent, it is worth returning to Kant's unique perspective on the ideality of the popular will.

Keywords: democracy, popular sovereignty, general will, political representation, Rousseau

The Kantian non-sublime and the fragility of existence (or Politics “when looking [finitude] in the face”)

Needless to say, by “non-sublime” we don’t mean beauty, but rather the negative momentary phase that, although being precisely what awakens the feeling of the sublime, is however deemed undeserving of the approving epithet “sublime”. Presumably, the main appeal of the sublime for a Kantian-type pursuit is the possibility of reaffirming once again that the intelligible realm is neither foreign nor inaccessible but properly ours. The analytic of the sublime had thus to be built in connection with our moral vocation, and less with any aesthetic aspect. Moreover, already in the second Critique, the sublime had been assigned the role of being the expression of our surpassing the bounds of our “sensible nature”.

Certainly, one could argue that the sensible had already been dealt with (that the sublime was thus inconsequential), that –though not always by Reason (Vernunft)– Kant’s need to prove the validity of our rational aspirations had already been satisfied. And yet, the pages allotted to the sublime are a singular stage exposing Kant’s struggle regarding a finitude that presents itself as contrapurposive.

Unlike knowledge, morality, and the beautiful, the sublime revealed –by way of the nonsublime– that finitude remained a challenge, a challenge Kant “solved” by abandoning sensibility (5:246). So is Kant negating finitude? No, and yet, to an extent, he is. Certainly, his philosophical system is rather a full admittance of finitude: knowledge is limited, acting morally is a duty, beauty is only valid for human beings (5:210), and regarding the sublime, the power of the sensible realm is unarguably underscored. However, affirming our independence from nature (5:261), i.e. our belonging to a radically other realm, is presented as “imperative”. Then again, if the sublime makes intuitable our rational vocation (5:257), this experience is possible only by escaping finitude and what it throws at us (5:261-262). Finitude’s insubordination – which Kant does not hide, but rather overexposes– is thus not obliterated: within this world, inadequacy remains and is inescapable. Consequently, there is no actual self-preservation [Selbsterhaltung; 5:261] for “what we are”: what we are is not a matter of (rational) nature but of praxis. It must be exercised.

Our aim is thus to read the non-sublime in another light: precisely because we are moral beings, what is imperative is to go beyond the all-too-comforting feeling of our superiority over nature. Feelings –even actions– can be (morally) fulfilled by limiting themselves to an individual reach, whereas the non-sublime, by emphasising the immeasurable variety of the sensible, points to finitude, i.e. to the world we inhabit. By manifesting itself as intractable, finitude makes the political emerge as (our) duty. It contends that, instead of turning its back on finitude, reason must “[look] the negative –in our case, finitude– in the face” [Phän. 27].

By incorporating in the discussion, our current political reality (its intractable plurality) but also –since Newtonian science influenced Kant’s thought– contemporary science (which opens our sights to the infinity within finitude), we will outline how the non-sublime can contribute to the present challenges of our being-in-the-world.

Keywords: non-sublime; finitude; inadequacy; plurality; politics

You and I. Intersubjectivity as a Corrective Mechanism for Moral Community in Kant's Critical Philosophy

Our present world struggles with deep societal polarisation fuelled by conflicting viewpoints. This raises a crucial question: how can we, as diverse individuals, build a framework for peaceful coexistence and a shared sense of community? Proponents of liberal democracies traditionally celebrate individual freedom and autonomy. However, these values can lead to societal fragmentation when individuals prioritize their own perspectives over a sense of shared purpose. Political discourse becomes dominated by technical arguments or power struggles, often devoid of any moral grounding. This essay argues that Kant's conception of intersubjectivity could offer a corrective mechanism.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant rejects the notion of an essential, pre-defined human nature. Instead, he emphasizes the role of both nature and reason in constituting human beings. This perspective leads him to explore the steps under which we can recognize each other not simply as individuals, but as rational beings. The first condition involves acknowledging the epistemic constraints inherent to human cognition. We are limited by our individual perspectives and experiences. However, despite these limitations, Kant argues that through reason, we can identify and understand the rationality present in others.

This recognition of another's rationality is not based solely on observation, but rather on a fundamental assumption about the underlying structure of human experience. Building upon this foundation of shared rationality, Kant argues that every individual possesses an intrinsic value and moral autonomy, deserving of respect. This is the cornerstone of Kant's concept of the "Kingdom of Ends," a realm where individuals interact as ends in themselves, not merely means to an end. In the context of societal co-existence, this translates to a paramount respect for others that forms the basis for meaningful dialogue.

However, Kant also recognises the complexity to put this idea into practice. Epistemic limitations remain - how do we determine who really belongs to this "Kingdom of Ends" or, in practice, who is an active citizen? This is where Kant's emphasis on recognition becomes crucial, providing an evaluative, and therefore corrective mechanism not only for his own anthropological settlements, but for many kinds of discriminatory demarcations that still exist in the contemporary political landscape. By applying his epistemic framework to truth claims, we can begin to create a common condition for exchange that can meet the standards of human capability qua reason.

The paper concludes by demonstrating how Kantian thought can be a starting point for addressing contemporary challenges. Most political movements still prioritize human freedom, autonomy, and equality, which need to be emphasized when addressing social injustices, natural disasters, and discrimination.

Keywords: Intersubjectivity, Political Philosophy, Critical Philosophy, Recognition, Epistemology

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'Deferred violence' and environmental ethics: Can Kantian anthropocentrism resolve presentism?

Responses to environmental crises from traditional moral and political philosophy perspectives generally suffer from two shortcomings: anthropocentrism and presentism. A deep ecology perspective that decenters the rational subjects, or conversely, extends the end in itself prerogative to nature is well-nigh inconceivable from the Kantian ethical premise. By holding on to anthropocentrism, however, it may yet offer better prospects to overcome presentism. In this day and age of crime mysteries, it is not far-fetched to imagine a story where the killer 'will have' committed a murder sometime in the future, after he is long dead. He sets in motion a series of events the consequences of which he is sure to evade. He commits 'deferred violence'. Remember that for Kant, violence consists precisely of treating human beings as means rather than an end in itself. By deferred violence, then, I refer to my use of somebody in future for my present ends. Despite compelling deep ecology arguments, this possibility of deferred violence is the governing paradigm of most of the efforts on environmental protection.

We should not lose sight of the fact that a significant number of dilemmas on matters regarding environmental crises are only political, not moral as they do not involve as much of a choice between the value of the lives of future generations and that of the lives of the present generation as a simpler choice between right and wrong. But by emphasizing the gulf between contractarian politics and his deontological ethics in Kant, I will argue presentism cannot be resolved politically. Kant's contractarian politics depends, as contractarianism typically does, on the reciprocity of resistance. Deferred violence eschews this reciprocity. Therefore, an interest-based community with the unborn is inconceivable. Kantian ethics, on the other hand, offers a vantage point for environmentalism that is outside of such temporal constrictions and it establishes a moral community among all human beings— dead, alive and unborn. An ethical perspective also allows environmental crises to present possible aporetic choices between the present generation and the future ones.

As it has been often remarked, the difficulty with deontology lies with determining what exactly is involved in treating others as ends in themselves; and for our specific concern, how does/should the environment concern us in treating the unborn generations justly? The latter part of this paper attempts to address this question by borrowing Paul Ricoeur's combining of Aristotle and Kant which treats teleology and deontology as two moments of the same action. Ricoeur's suggestion involves substituting 'humanity' in the second categorical imperative with 'fundamental goods'— goods without which "the exercise of free choice and the development of a life governed by reasoned intentions would be impossible". By considering the environment as a fundamental good of this sort, I argue that it is possible to provide a better appraisal of Kantian anthropocentrism within environmental ethics.

Keywords: Presentism, anthropocentrism, Kantian ethics, Contractarian politics

A Kantian AI ethics of egalitarian governance

In the face of rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, the need for an ethical framework that addresses the moral and political implications of AI governance becomes increasingly urgent, as attested by AI theories of value alignment. This essay proposes a Kantian-inspired AI ethics of republican, egalitarian governance, drawing from Immanuel Kant's ethical and political theories to offer a robust foundation for AI ethics and a feminist critical theory of AI governance. By integrating the foundational principles of Kant's deontological ethics with insights from Rawls's, Foucault's, and feminist critiques, we propose a hybrid, deontological model of AI ethics that combines teleological (perfectionist and egalitarian virtues) and utilitarian (altruist, pragmatist consequentialism). Value alignment points thus to the importance of treating humanity as an end in itself and adhering to the so-called second version of the categorical imperative, which requires that our actions be universalizable and applied to all human beings. For AI ethics, this translates into several key principles, such as assuming that no other value can be more fundamental or foundational than human dignity and worth. This principle is critical in ensuring that AI technologies are developed and deployed in ways that respect and enhance human life rather than threaten, diminish, or annihilate it. The foundational value of humanness must be universalizable, meaning that it applies to all individuals regardless of particular features such as nationality, gender, race, religion, social class, income, etc. This aligns with Kant's emphasis on moral laws' universal validity and applicability. To address the complexities of modern societies and cultural diversity, Kantian AI ethics must be intersectionally egalitarian, acknowledging and addressing individuals' diverse and intersecting identities and experiences. This involves recognizing and mitigating the ways in which AI technologies might reinforce or exacerbate existing social inequalities, including those of gender and ethnicity, especially in emergent democracies such as Brazil and Latin America. Cultivating moral virtues, especially a sense of justice, is essential in guiding the development and use of AI. This involves fostering virtues in individuals and institutions to ensure that AI technologies are aligned with the broader goal of promoting justice and the common good. AI ethics should also consider the outcomes and consequences of AI technologies, aiming to maximize overall well-being and minimize harm. This requires a careful analysis of the potential impacts of AI on different segments of society and the environment. Adhering to moral duties and principles is crucial in AI ethics. This involves ensuring that AI technologies respect fundamental rights and freedoms, uphold justice, and do not treat individuals merely as means to an end. Moreover, Kantian AI ethics can successfully subscribe to nonreductionist, mitigated versions of both naturalism and constructivism.

Nonreductionist naturalism acknowledges the role of natural and social sciences in moral reasoning without reducing ethical principles to empirical facts. Conversely, constructivism emphasizes the role of human reason and social practices in shaping ethical norms. By integrating these perspectives, Kantian AI ethics bridges the gap between empirical features and normative principles.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Deontological Ethics, Humanity, Utilitarianism, Value Alignment

An Essay on Transcendental Validity of Kant's Ethics

In this paper, I challenge the widely shared view that Kant's ethics can be reduced to a mere rational decision-making procedure based on unconditional categorical imperatives. It argues that this understanding of Kant's ethics is limited and does not take into account the metaphysical components of moral decision-making. Instead, I suggest that Kant's practical philosophy should also embrace the Copernican Revolution. The main thesis is to prove the transcendental validity of Kant's ethics in the context of his Copernican project. It seeks to answer how positive moral content can be obtained in practical moral determinations in Kant's ethics through the faculty of sense, despite the assumption of a lack of legacy in particular moral actions.

The paper begins by examining the definition of philosophy in Kant's work and how it relates to practical philosophy. It then explores the dual nature of the Copernican Revolution and its impact on the problem of reality in both theoretical and practical philosophy. It then investigates the four possible outcomes of the Copernican Revolution in Kant's philosophy, transcendental idealism and empirical realism, and transcendental realism and empirical idealism, which reverses the relationship between cognition and reality from "all our cognition must conform to the objects" to "the objects must conform to our cognition."

The second section focuses on the great chasm between theoretical and practical reason and how they are two separate divisions of the same reason. The pure practical reason works to eliminate everything empirical, but it does not imply that these two approaches are in different territories. The validity of the network of moral laws is a key concern, and the paper asserts the postulate of God is seen as a potential threat to the validity of these moral laws due to the risk of transcendental illusion.

In the third section, the paper touches upon the transcendental illusion in practical philosophy caused by the postulate of God and the validity problem of the network of moral laws. It proposes that objects in reality with sensible conditions can be illuminated by empirical psychology and that the thought experiment "Socrates' Escape" can show how empirical psychology can affect causality mechanisms in particular moral determinations.

The paper concludes by proposing that the validation of Kant's ethics requires the activation of reason through thought experiments. The contribution of the thesis to metaethical constructivism debates lies in its demonstration that Kant should not have awoken from his dogmatic slumber only for his theoretical philosophy but should also embrace the Copernican Revolution to fully address the validity of his moral principles.

Keywords: Kant's ethics, practical philosophy, transcendental validity, Copernican Revolution, empirical psychology.

Kant and the Limits of Property

An object's coming under one person's ownership changes the situation of all others. Whereas previously they were at liberty (in Hohfeld's sense) to use the object they now no longer are (Nozick 1974, 175). For Kantians, the loss of liberty itself suffices to render this change problematic. For Lockeans, the crucial point is whether the loss of liberty through appropriation of an unowned object worsens the situation of others (e.g. in terms of welfare). In either case, it appears that a full theory of (natural) property rights would have to specify limits on our property in external goods (Simmons 1992, 278). A widespread assumption holds that "any adequate theory of justice in acquisition will contain a proviso similar to [...] Locke," in order to specify these limits (Nozick 1974, 178).

In this paper, I challenge this assumption by offering a reading of Kant's theory of ownership in the Doctrine of Right that is capable of imposing limits on property rights without requiring the use of any proviso. In defending this claim, I engage with and reject recent interpretations of Kant's theory of property rights that doubt the existence of limits on property rights within the Kantian framework (see Ripstein 2009, 63; 67; 92), as well as those views that — in light of this conclusion — combine Kantian property rights with the Lockean (fair-use) proviso (e.g. Stilz 2019).

In particular, I argue that Kantian property rights are subject to two different types of limits: interpersonal limits and intra-personal limits. Inter-personal limits are limits that arise through the interaction of different individuals. Individuals, according to Kant (6:237-8), enjoy an innate, equal right to freedom (as independence from each other). Because they enjoy this equal right to freedom, individuals are entitled to claim external objects as their own (6:247). By claiming external objects as their own, i.e. through appropriation, individuals impose duties on each other, namely by removing other individuals' liberty to use that object without their consent (6:245). I argue, in line with the universal principle of right (6:230), that the imposition of duties through appropriation of external objects constitutes an interference with the freedom of other individuals only when it violates their equal opportunities to appropriate, thus adopting a moralized understanding of freedom.

Intra-personal limits to property rights follow from individuals' duties to oneself. Against the view that duties to oneself do not figure in the realm of rights (see for example Singer 1958), I argue that individuals have a right in form of an unwaivable duty not to interfere with their own freedom from a second-personal view that limit property rights intra-personally (see for non-property related versions of similar arguments Schofield 2015; Parfit 1984, 327-8). Having defended the two types of limits that arise within the Kantian framework, I spell out a particular version of these in relation to natural resources, arguing that individuals only acquire usufruct rights over natural resources.

Keywords: Kant, Property, Limits, Rights, Natural Resources

Lawful Freedom as the Self-Construction of Peace and Justice: Rereading Kant with Fichte and Schlegel

The three definitive articles of Perpetual Peace provide the three positive conditions for lasting peace, i.e., republicanism, federalism, and cosmopolitanism. These conditions appear to be interdependent and complementary, forming a complete lawful system despite their distinctive qualities. The possibility of lasting peace would rest on a multilayered framework of perfect lawfulness produced by the cumulative and joint effect of republican civil law, federal international law, and cosmopolitan law. The sequence of exposition in ZeF starts with the society of individuals, passes through the society of nations, and reaches the whole world. Such exposition cannot be equated with a logical deduction in which republicanism would virtually encompass and give rise to federalism of free states and cosmopolitan law. However, in line with the opening paragraph of Section II (ZeF, 8: 348-349), one must ask whether this exposition discloses the logically optimal architecture of a social ontology of peace. If so, then it would hence follow that the rational critique of the a priori concept of right, lawfulness, understood as lawful freedom, would contain strong relationships of entailment: 1) lawfulness entails peace; 2) peace entails the realization of republican citizenship, i.e., a system of equally free and co-legislative individuals; 3) republicanism ad intra entails republicanism ad extra, that is to say, a republican community of free individuals will necessarily engage in the construction of a republican community of free peoples/nations; 4) the expansion of republicanism entails the recognition of cosmopolitanism, i.e., the equal rights of persons as world citizens. In the Kantian framework, federalism and cosmopolitanism could be considered as the natural self-expansion and rational self-development of republicanism. When republicanism ad intra becomes republicanism ad extra, then the republican federation of free states and the republican recognition of cosmopolitan citizenship unfold as if they were contained in the epigenome of republicanism. Fichte's and Schlegel's immediate reception of ZeF pleads in favor of the essential firstness of republicanism. Indeed, in his review of the Kantian essay, Fichte (1796, Werke I, 3: 221-228; SW 08: 427-436) emphasizes the rational foundation of Kant's Hauptidee: perpetual peace is not a "pious wish" or a "beautiful dream" (SW 08: 427), but rather an idea that "resides in the essence of reason," and thereby belongs to the "ends of nature" (Zwecke der Natur) that can be postponed, yet not annihilated (SW 08: 428). Like a rational residue of optimistic theodicy, the sure juridical accomplishment of quasi-necessary perpetual peace constitutes a real process of natural and historical development. Fichte endorses this view by deriving the guarantee of peace from the "recognition of rightful laws" (Anerkenntniss des Rechtsgesetzes) inherent in the republican concept of a "community of free beings" (SW 08: 430). In Schlegel's perspective (1796, Versuch über den Begriff des Republikanismus, in Ausgabe 07: 11-25), one can deduce from the categorical political imperative the practical necessity of republicanism and from republicanism the universal republicanism involving all individuals and states in a community with peaceful, fraternal, and isonomic relationships among autonomous individuals.

Keywords: Just war; Perpetual peace; Republicanism; Federalism; Cosmopolitanism

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Commoning the Atmosphere for the Perpetual Climate Justice: A Philosophical Sketch

Taking inspiration from and building on Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace, this paper formulates the principles for the global commoning of the atmosphere to limit greenhouse gas emissions and to avoid dangerous climate change. First, the paper discusses the moral significance of climate stability from the perspective of global justice. To the existing debate it adds the perspective of the tragedy of the commons to describe the current state of the affairs – the unequal depletion of the atmospheric carbon sink – and compares unregulated and unequal emissions to war as a primitive and unjust way of conducting international relations. Aligned with Kant’s thought, the paper argues against a world government and makes a case for a league of states creating a system of the commons over the atmospheric sink. The second part of the paper identifies a range of principles to be recognized and implemented by states to avoid dangerous and unjust climate change and become the commoners with respect to the global commons of the atmospheric carbon sink. These include, prominently, the recognition of limited sovereignty over global common-pool natural resources. While the paper builds on Kant, it also makes references to the current climate policies and agreements and their defects from the perspective of securing perpetual climate stability and justice.

The Limit of Knowledge and the Structure of Will: J.F. Fries's Solutions to Intelligible Fatalism

In this talk I will focus on J.F. Fries's conception of intelligible fatalism. Intelligible fatalism is the theory – first proposed by C.C.E. Schmid – that acting against the moral law cannot be 'sufficiently' grounded in the freedom of the will but substantially de-pends on intelligible obstacles to the efficacy of reason's moral agency. Schmid takes this theory to be a result of the Kantian theory of morality and freedom. The theory of intelligible fatalism was harshly debated and criticised by several philosophers, e.g. Reinhold, Fichte, and Schwab, who considered it to have the implausible consequence that morally reproachable actions are not free *stricto sensu*. This argument was also directed against Kant's theory of morality and freedom, which seemed to lead to the same results. I will argue that Fries is fully aware of the background debate on the tenability of the Kantian-Schmidian theory of morality and freedom and is sensitive to the critiques raised against this theory. I will argue that Fries provides two different solutions to the question of intelligible fatalism. The first solution is essentially based on the Kantian thought that there is a structural limit of our cognitive claims. The question of whether intelligible fatalism is true or not lies beyond this limit; therefore, it cannot be answered positively. The second solution substantially hinges on Fries's critical interpretation of Kant's theory of evil. According to Fries, Kant's theory of the human being's 'propensity to evil' is committed to a 'naturalistic fallacy'. By this, Fries aims to highlight that, in Kant's view, evil is rooted in the sphere of the most fundamental impulses ('Triebe') of human being. However, Fries takes this theory to be ill-grounded because it confuses the 'faculty of drives' ('Vermögen der Antriebe') with the faculty of decision ('Entschließungsvermögen') and, therefore, entails that the morally acceptable action only depends on the higher 'vivacity' of the moral drive. I will then argue that it is possible for Fries to overcome intelligible fatalism by positing that the question of whether a morally reproachable action is free or not should be resolved, not on the level of the drive i.e. the determining ground of the action, but on the level of decision i.e. the individual will's reflective recognition of the efficacy of the drive for grounding the action.

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Cosmopolitan Right and People's Sovereignty in the Aetas Kantiana

Since the late 1990s Kant's notion of cosmopolitan right has received increasing attention, fostered by the acceleration of the 'dialectic of globalisation' and the rise of the topic of migration to the center of public, political and philosophical discourse (see Reinhardt, 2019; Loewe 2019, Huber 2022, Taraborrelli 2022). Scholars agree that the introduction of cosmopolitan right - as third category of public right, in addition to constitutional right and international right - represents one of the main innovations of Kant's doctrine of right. On the contrary, there is still no agreement what concerns the content, status and foundation of Kant's cosmopolitan right, the form of the duties it entails (see for instance Miller 2022, Reinhardt 2022) and the problem of its "institutionalization", whereby competing readings do not reflect only exegetical controversies, but also divergent political concerns and different views of the "justice of migration" (Picardi 2022). My paper aims at shedding light on these issues by taking into account the reception of Kant's notion of cosmopolitan right within the so-called "Kantian school", whose contribution for bringing out fully the Kantian principle of equal freedom enjoyed recently a revival of interest, especially through Maliks' researches (Maliks 2024).

My point of departure will be an overview of the reception of Kant's notion of cosmopolitan right after the publication of Z&F, not only in the well-known responses to Kant's essay – composed by Fichte, Friedrich Schlegel and Görres – but also in less-known reviews. In spite of their lack of originality, the latter reveal very clearly that Kant's contemporaries read and misread the third definitive article in the light of the historical "turning point" of the Declaration of the Rights of Man at the end of the eighteenth century (Arendt 1973, 290).

On the background of this overview, I will focus on the tense relationship between people's sovereignty and cosmopolitan right – conceived of as "human right" – which can be grasped in the writings of Kant's "radical followers", by taking into account especially Tietfrunk's *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Privat- und öffentliche Recht* (Halle, 1798), which has thus far been almost "ignored" (Kloos 2015), except for some hints in Maliks' and Kleingeld's essays. Although this work suffers from Tietfrunk's "tendency to be long-winded (...)" – differently from "his first works, which did not go beyond what Kant said, but simply paraphrase him" (Lehner 2010) – for the purposes of my contribution the very supplements that Tietfrunk adds to his paraphrase of Kant's RL deserve careful examination, as they make it possible to grasp both the radicalisation to which Tietfrunk subjects Kant's cosmopolitan right – and especially its anti-colonial instance – and the lucid awareness of the difficult balance between popular sovereignty and cosmopolitan right, interpreted as human right.

Keywords: Cosmopolitan Right, Human Rights, Sovereignty, People, Migration

The ongoing relevance of Kant's Perpetual Peace

In order to surpass the palliative measures of armistices, Immanuel Kant proposes in *Perpetual Peace* a new legal paradigm for international relations. Although Kant's opusculum be preceded by the works of Abbé de Saint Pierre and Hugo Grotius—seminal authors and proposers of everlasting peace treatises—the aprioristic reasoning of the greatest philosopher of the enlightenment offers a deeper foundation for the undying hope of an enduring peace between countries. The preoccupation regarding the making of international laws in order to establish or maintain peace between countries has taken a qualitative turn after the end of the II World War. Although significant advancements occurred in occasions such as the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907), it is really the outcome after the defeat of the Axis Powers that establishes a more committed attitude towards a global understanding. Of course, the Cold War marked the rest of the twentieth century and the threat of terrorism has lurked in the current century. Needless to say, the world is still a hazardous place permeated by armed conflicts such as the Russo-Ukrainian war and the apparently endless conflict between Israelis and Palestines.

However, the pursuit for overcoming the state of nature that permeates international relations is still alive as it is the kantian thinking overall. Thus, the philosophical project for a perpetual peace—no matter how far away it seems to be in the horizon of history—is still a plausible and viable thesis. Since Kant sees republicanism as the foremost requirement for the establishment of a league of nations (basically the blueprint for today's United Nations), one can say that from the 1970's onwards we can see a positive trajectory towards a global spread of republic as the dominant form of government. Statistics show a steady expansion and, maybe most importantly, a rootness of republicanism throughout the globe. Of course we cannot make room for naive optimism. It could be argued that a more realistic account of 21st century geopolitics almost forces an honest examiner to reach the conclusion that the human race seems doomed to be the author of its own extinction. Such take is probably the most plausible or at least one of the outcomes with a greater amount of chance in the range of possibilities. Nonetheless, the ongoing increase of cosmopolitanism rights stands as evidence that the case for a global peace such as Immanuel Kant envisioned is certainly a possible and doable state of affairs.

Keywords: Kant. International Law. International Relations. Geopolitics. United Nations

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Nature, finality and teleology in Kant and Jonas: A reflection for an environmentalist perspective

The paper intends to compare the philosophical perspectives of Kant and Jonas, in particular by pointing out the concepts of nature, finality and teleology that emerge from them and some ethical implications of their connection.

The first part will focus on the idea, common to both philosophers, that human beings and nature are endowed with a "telos". This, in Jonas' perspective, implies the development of the organism has a certain structure that orients it towards the preservation of life. This consideration places human beings in nature, but in a special position and determines a certain way of understanding nature itself, which affects all faculties and organic functions.

This idea constitutes the ontological framework of the ethical perspective that requires the preservation of life and is aimed at safeguarding future generations. Kant also speaks of the human beings' specificity related to the concept of finality. In fact, they are the only ones that can autonomously attribute finality to themselves. At the same time, they are included in the natural order, which is also ontologically oriented.

In Kant and Jonas, the telos concerning the individual is different, but the general consideration is similar, attempting to find an intermediate position between mechanicism and finalism and likewise to preserve freedom. In Kantian "Kritik der Urteilskraft" this conciliation takes place thanks to the idea that teleological judgement is not determinative, but reflective. We must think of reality and nature as oriented towards an end, even if this consideration is not a scientific knowledge. In Jonas, the conciliation is possible thanks to the search for and definition of an ontological presupposition.

The second part of the paper will focus on the relationship that the teleological framework has with the ethical reflection of the two philosophers. Firstly, we will emphasise Kantian inheritance in Jonas' philosophy, even if in a theoretical and practical framework that is structured from a critique of the Kantian approach itself. On the other hand, we consider the importance of the philosophical perspective of Jonas in outlining a political philosophy that focuses on the preservation of life and humanity on earth. This instance is projected into the future and its justification is linked to an ontological substratum, a certain vision of the human being and his purpose on earth in a 'unitary' consideration of what exists.

Keywords: Kant, Jonas, nature, teleology, responsibility.

Lebensgefühl and Kant's Critique of Life

This paper considers Kant's transcendental theory of life as organised and self-organising being, arguing that Kant's thinking life is relevant to current theories on the origins and emergence of life. It asks whether teleological judgement operates as a form of non-linear recursive reasoning that may be understood as guided by Lebensgefühl and considers the extent to which Kant conceives life in technical terms, arguing that Kant's critique of life bears direct relevance on contemporary theories of life and synthetic biology.

Immanuel Kant is often heralded as the father of our modern epistemology of scientific inquiry. The shift toward this epistemic regime arose from two seminal discoveries, first Kant's transcendental aesthetic which announced that space and time bore no objective reality but were instead pure forms of intuition, making possible the capture of data in sensible form, and second, the consequence of this so-called Copernican revolution, namely a subject-driven ontology wherein the objects of knowledge are formed through the human lens of the categories of the understanding. The result is that the known becomes the progenitor of the field of the knowable such that the human becomes occluded through the imperatives established by the very knowledge thus produced. Epistemic needs generate ontological realities.

If the implication of Kant's view is that the real is a function of the forms through which sensible intuitions are structured, then it follows that objective reality itself lays the foundation for further knowledge inquiries and is therefore productive and dynamic. Kant recognised this aporia and, eventually came to doubt that scientific inquiry, however powerful, could ever provide an explanation for the origin and evolution of life. Thus in 1790, in the final paragraphs of his Critique of Judgement, he concludes there will never be a Newton to 'explain to us, in terms of natural laws unordered by any intention, how even a mere blade of grass is produced' (§75:401). Kant's endeavour to critique life led him to comprehend the limitations in the Newtonian world view and in his later philosophy to engage critically with life as a productive force that interprets law dynamically and functionally.

Kant concludes that teleological judgement, though not constitutive of the objects of experience, nevertheless forms the necessary heuristic for production of knowledge concerning living nature. It establishes an essential disposition guiding judgement's comprehension of self-determining systems that operate as organisms as in biological processes. However, theories that regard the laws of living nature as driven by any form of purposiveness, or consistent with any form of finalism, are challenged by modern molecular biology. Jacques Monod, for example, entirely rejects all teleological approaches to evolutionary theory as reintroducing the spectre of anthropocentrism in implicitly denying that 'chance alone', 'absolutely free but blind', is at the 'source of every innovation, of all creation in the biosphere' (Monod 112-13). By contrast, the promise of synthetic biology and genetic engineering through technologies such as CRISPR reframe evolution anthropocentrically on terms guided by human intentions and values, potentially imbuing living nature (as art) with human purposiveness. This paper will reconsider Kant's critique of life to argue that Kant's rejection of a purely mechanistic understanding of living nature combined with his teleological account of the organism offers a paradigm through which to comprehend life as a productive force ethically imbricated.

Keywords: Life, Feeling of Life [das Lebensgefühl], Life Force [Lebenskraft], organised being, teleological reasoning.

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Reimagining Progress Today: 'neo-Kantian' Kant and Contemporary Political Discourse

The purpose of this intervention is to investigate how Kantian normativism can be utilized as a heuristic tool to examine contemporary societies and inform progressive policies with an ethical foundation. To achieve this, we will inspect both Kantian works and the classical examinations by neo-Kantian authors, which have seen a resurgence in academic interest in recent decades.

At the core of this inquiry is Kantian normativism, which offers a foundational framework for progressive policies in today's political landscape. Kant's normative structure provides a valid agenda for addressing contemporary socio-economic issues, making it essential to reignite a debate on constructing a more egalitarian society within our democracies nowadays.

Our examination extends beyond Kant's ethics to consider his entire philosophical system. We begin by scrutinizing the neo-Kantian reference to teleological rationality in Kantian works to advocate for universal progress. This exploration includes Kantian historical-philosophical writings, central to Cassirer's interpretation, and the original resignification of these themes in Cohen's critique of capitalism. Through this approach, the Marburg school philosopher criticizes capitalism, emphasizing gradual societal progress toward equality and rights.

Cohen's theoretical proposition of embodied ethical rationality posits that ethical regulations should embody the Kantian idea of the unity of humankind. He identified contradictions in the labor laws of his time that contravened the Kantian ideal of humanity, formulating a critique centered on developing a Neo-Kantianism based on Kant's transcendental logic. His seminal preface to Lange's *History of Materialism* (1896) explores the interrelation between logic and physics, ethics and religion, and ethics and politics.

Cohen's political philosophy extends beyond applying Kant's 'Formula of Humanity' to capitalism, signifying a critical enhancement of Kantian theory by integrating historical and psychological contexts into normative principles. His redefinition of the categorical imperative underscores institutionalized social norms aiming at a just society, establishing his concept of ethical rationality as the 'logic of the cultural sciences'. This constructivist approach, aligning ethics with the systematicity of mathematics, delineates Cohen's rationalist-idealist stance. His socialism, deeply rooted in his Judaism, emphasizes the intertwining of rationality and teleology, providing a robust framework for addressing modern socio-economic challenges.

Recent interpretations demonstrate how Kantian principles have an ongoing relevance for contemporary political philosophy. These studies reveal how Kantian moral principles can be harmonized with effective political action, advocating for empirically grounded reforms aligned with long-term ethical goals. Additionally, they highlight the significance of political judgment in navigating the complexities of law and governance, anchoring Kantianism with political pragmatism. Moreover, integrating transnational perspectives reimagines cosmopolitan justice, promoting solidarity and challenging established norms.

Reevaluating these historically-politically based considerations, we examine how a mixture of Marburg school attire interpretations and the very newest Kantian studies can provide heady tools

for addressing modern socio-economic questions and ethical concerns. In this way, we underscore the enduring importance of Kantian thought in contemporary political philosophy and its potential to drive ethical governance and foster social progress.

What does constitutive mean?

Over the past two decades, numerous authors (among which Berkovitz 2020, Bitbol, Kerszberg, Petitot 2009, Darrigol 2020, Friedman 2001) have identified specific elements of scientific theories as 'constitutive', without adequately defining this notion. In this talk, I aim to elucidate the various meanings of this term, tracing it back to its Kantian roots. More specifically, I defend three claims.

First, I claim that Kant used the term "konstitutiv" both in a narrow and broad sense, referring respectively to intuition and experience. This point, which was partially developed by Friedman (1991), is deepened and advanced within a framework that does not strongly commit Kant's transcendental philosophy to Newtonian mechanics.

Second, by examining both the Analytic of Principles and the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason, I claim that constitutive principles functionally define what qualifies and what does not qualify as an object of intuition and as an object of experience. Thereby, they endow their respective target to be included in meaningful statements (Kant's judgments), i.e. statements exhibiting a truth value. This activity of constitution transforms the notion of 'object' from an independent and merely present substance to a set of functionally related values. Furthermore, the previous analysis enables to compare constitutive principles with the formal notion of 'presupposition' and to sharply differentiate them from other similar notions, like 'premise', 'axiom', 'necessary condition', and 'convention', due to their unique semantic role, as suggested in Brittan (1978).

Third, I defend the thesis that constitutive principles are indissolubly intertwined with transcendental arguments. Indeed, transcendental arguments justify the modal status of such principles, setting them apart from empirical, contingent, and non-necessary principles. These criteria may prove useful in evaluating the various post-Kantian reformulations of constitutive principles. Moreover, my analysis distinguishes the constitutive from the regulative principles addressing also the fact that they cooperate and merge in the empirical investigation of nature.

Keywords: constitutive, constitution, science, presupposition, regulative.

Kant the Naturalist?

With his transcendental philosophy, Kant first envisioned a meta-level a priori investigation into those necessary conditions that enable us to conduct base-level a posteriori investigations, such as scientific investigations of the natural world (cf. Friedman 2001, p. 9). Now, given this description of it, Kant's transcendentalism seems to be completely at odds with the standard naturalistic world-picture in philosophy (cf. Gardner 2001, p. 552). According to this picture, there's no privileged level of philosophical investigation (Maddy 2000, p. 107); rather, philosophy should be conducted "in the same empirical spirit", and thus with the same experimental methods, of the natural sciences (Quine 1969, p. 26). And that would arguably have been anathema to Kant. The possibilities of reconciliation between Kant's transcendental philosophy and philosophical naturalism as it is standardly conceived thus look rather bleak. Recently, however, some authors have suggested that Kant's transcendentalism may be reconciled with philosophical naturalism in a humanistic ('liberal' or 'soft') variant, concerned with the culturally embedded exercises of our human rationality, as opposed to the scientific ('conservative' or 'hard') variant briefly described above (Louden 2019; cf. O'Shea 2023, pp. 18-20).¹ In this paper, I will answer the question: Is that even possible? My discussion will be in four sections. In § 1, I give a Kant-inspired definition of Naturalism, and of its two main variants, namely Scientific Naturalism and Humanistic Naturalism. In § 2, I argue that, philosophically speaking, Kant cannot be a scientific naturalist (which was to be expected). In § 3, that, philosophically speaking, Kant cannot be a humanistic naturalist either (which is the more controversial issue). If so, it is impossible for Kant to be a philosophical naturalist at all. However, by the final § 4, I will articulate the view that Kant may be a naturalist in other (non-philosophical) respects. By relying on a Kantian distinction between the levels of philosophy and experience, I will argue that Kant was a transcendentalist at the philosophical level and a (scientific and humanistic) naturalist at the experiential one, as attested by his combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism, which is amiable to both natural science and common sense.

Some readers might find the bottom line of the paper border-line trivial. Of course – they will think – Kant could be read as a naturalist in this watered-down sense. I fully agree. But if I am not mistaken, this perceived triviality is not a flaw in my account, but rather the reflection of the sheer broadness of the general category 'Naturalism', which has been discussed by philosophers such as Barry Stroud (1996, pp. 43-4) and Hilary Putnam (2004, p. 59). It is just a consequence of this 'broadness' that even Kant might be read as a naturalist, provided we take the term in a non-philosophical sense. The paper's real contribution, however, lies in demonstrating that this is the most that naturalist readers of Kant can ever have: Kant's transcendentalism is just incompatible with philosophical naturalism.

Keywords: transcendental philosophy; naturalism; science; human nature; method.

Kant and the Skeptical Road to Freedom

Odo Marquard became one of Germany's most important scholars after publishing his first book, "Skeptische Methode im Blick auf Kant", in 1958. The book was devoted largely to the analysis of Kant's skeptical method. In the wake of Marquard's seminal work, some scholars in subsequent years, particularly in the Anglophone cultural area, confirmed that Kant was well aware of the skeptical tradition and that he adapted his philosophy to it, having no definitive answers to its deepest questions. Unfortunately, the ensuing debate received little attention in Italy. My paper, which is part of an extensive and dense body of research on modern skepticism, but completely new for the part concerning Kant, is aimed at exploring the possible political implications of Kant's approach to epistemological skepticism.

In a famous passage from the "Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics" (1783), Kant confessed his intellectual debt to David Hume, the most authoritative exponent of modern skepticism, for having awakened him from "dogmatic slumber" and having given his "investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction". But Kant's skepticism did not stem solely from Hume. In fact, student notes from his lectures in the early 1770s mention not only Hume, but also Bayle, another well-known proponent of French skepticism. Furthermore, in 1798 Kant dedicated "The Conflict of the Faculties" (1798) to Carl Friedrich Staudlin, whose "Geschichte und Geist des Skeptizismus" (1794) placed Kant at the end of skeptical tradition. It is not surprising, then, that Kant took skepticism quite seriously and that his philosophy was literally created in response to skepticism.

Skepticism influenced Kant from the start of his intellectual career. His notes from the 1750s, published in the "Logic" after his death, show an interest in "Pyrrhonian and academic doubt" because they refer to the dutiful rejection of "dogmas". Finally, Kant's appeal to the "public" exercise of reason, contained in "What is Enlightenment?" (1784), a work in which he placed his hopes in freedom of the press and the right to public criticism of power, is fundamentally a re-enactment of the tradition of skepticism.

I would like to demonstrate that the critique of epistemological skepticism presented the core issues of Kant's philosophical investigation. In his intellectual challenge, he ended up adopting the skeptical method, which invoked intellectual freedom as a precondition for any possible philosophical inquiry and moral and political activity. For Kant, as for Hume and any other modern skeptic, what distinguishes the skeptic from the dogmatic are attitudes toward beliefs, not beliefs themselves. The skeptic considers the dogmatist's eagerness for certainty to be extremely harmful, because it sometimes involves the use of violence or other means of persuasion, in contrast to civil, free, open and moderate "conversation". Although skeptics are frequently regarded as malicious geniuses, whose doubts are disturbing, shocking and terrifying, and which can do nothing more than encourage moral and political quietism, they are true masters of pluralism, tolerance, and nonviolence. Even in the declination offered by Kant, the skeptical attitude represents the good path to follow.

Keywords: Kant - Hume - skepticism - freedom - public criticism

Kant's Ethics of Autonomy

In her *Ethics of Ambiguity*, Simone de Beauvoir places Kant's ethics "at the origin of all ethics of autonomy". One might find the association surprising. The existentialists, de Beauvoir included, prize above all individual freedom, "the plurality of concrete, singular men projecting themselves towards their own ends on the basis of situations whose particularity is as radical and as irreducible as subjectivity itself". Kant's emphasis on pure practical reason, meanwhile, might seem to totally overwhelm individuality. Whereas the existentialists have trouble providing any determinate content to their ethics, Kant details an abundance of duties holding categorically for all, regardless of the particularities of one's situation.

In this talk I clarify where Kant stands with respect to the ethics of autonomy. Unlike de Beauvoir, I do not place him at the origin --- that honorific belongs to Socrates. Nonetheless, no philosopher has done more to systematically work through the implications of the anti-moralistic commitment at the heart of the ethics of autonomy: that the demands of morality must be able to move the agent through the agent's own autonomous functioning of her will, lest morality itself fail to evince a certain kind of dignity. To put the point somewhat provocatively, in Kant's ethics it is not just that ought implies can, but that ought must imply can, where the force of this injunction is ethical.

This commitment is anti-moralistic because it rests on a conception of justification which rejects arbitrary ethical injunctions, i.e. injunctions enjoined through an arbiter lacking the requisite authority to represent morality itself. What distinguishes Kant from other rationalists is that he examines how reason must be for it not to be arbitrary. Developing this thought, I distinguish the concepts of practical rationality and practical reason. Painting broadly, practical rationality is an agent's capacity to guide her actions in light of her ends. Standards of practical rationality, such as requirements of means-end coherence, regulate the successful exercise of this capacity. Practical reason, on the other hand, is an agent's capacity to justify her action, or to act as she ought. For Kant, however, these capacities are not, at bottom, distinct: "[t]he will itself, strictly speaking, has no determining ground; insofar as it can determine choice, it is instead practical reason itself". I argue that this is exactly the view of the relation between practical rationality and practical reason one should have should one aim to avoid the kind of moralism the existentialists found so distasteful; should one, in other words, prize above all individual freedom.

As moral discourse becomes more polarized, and as the last vestiges of traditional modes of arbitrary ethical authority are shed, Kant's ethics of autonomy stands as a beacon. Unlike the existentialists, Kant has much to offer for the guidance of our action. And yet his injunctions are just as firmly rooted in the exercise of our own agency; to the extent that any are not, he gives us the grounds to reject them.

Keywords: morality, rationality, reason, constitutivism, moralism

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What is Kant's Ideal of a Rightful Association? an Otherworldly Ideal and Worldly Peace in Kant's Political Philosophy

Kant's political philosophy is both praised and criticised for its idealism. Critics dismiss Kant's otherworldly – or noumenal – ideals as ineffective or pernicious impositions on the worldly affairs of politics. Proponents argue that Kant's idealism allows worldly politics to strive for otherworldly aspirations and values of freedom, equality, and peace. Either way, ideals are central to Kant's political philosophy.

It is then a somewhat surprising fact that Kant only formulates one ideal in his most developed and substantial work of political philosophy *The Doctrine of Right* – “the ideal of a rightful association” (6:355). This poses two questions: What is the ideal of a rightful association? And why is there only one ideal in Kant's political philosophy? Through answering these questions, this paper proposes a novel interpretation of how Kant's political philosophy brings otherworldly ideals to bear on the worldly pursuit of peace through politics.

In response to the first question – what is the ideal of a rightful association? – the location of the formulation in the conclusion, which culminates in his declaration that perpetual peace is the “highest political good” (6:355), suggests that the ideal refers to perpetual peace. The association might then be identified with the “congress of states” under the principles of the right of nations, (6:350) or the idea of a cosmopolitan “community of all nations on the earth” (6:352). However, Kant argues that the ideal is “a rule” for the “constitution” that unites human beings and neither the congress of states nor the cosmopolitan community is bound by a constitution (6:355). Only the state is bound by a constitution in Kant's political philosophy. The ideal of a rightful association is thus not an international or cosmopolitan ideal, but rather the ideal of a pure republic or “the state in idea” (6:313).

To answer the second question – why is there only one ideal in Kant's political philosophy? – I draw on Kant's distinction in the first *Critique* between ideas and ideals, the latter of which is an individual entity determined through an idea of reason alone (A567/B595–A568/B596). In Kant's political philosophy, only a state's constitution binds a multiplicity of human beings into a unified individual entity, and so only the state is an individual entity which can take ideal form. If this interpretation is right, it yields a stark conclusion: perpetual peace may be “the entire final end of the doctrine of right” but it cannot be an ideal (6:355).

What then is perpetual peace? I argue that Kant refers to perpetual peace in two ways. It is an “unachievable idea” because it cannot be formulated as an otherworldly ideal to strive for (6:350). However, in striving to realise the ideal of a rightful association, we may hope to contribute to bringing about perpetual peace as “the highest political good”, not as an otherworldly ideal, but as a worldly “end to the heinous waging of war” (6:355). In Kant's political philosophy, in striving for an otherworldly ideal, we hope to contribute to changing this world.

Keywords: perpetual peace; the ideal of a rightful association; otherworldly ideals; worldly politics; constitution; hope

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Contemporary Realism and The Reevaluation of Transcendental Philosophy

The very kernel of Kant's philosophy, namely, the project of transcendental philosophy, has already come under attack. This pressure has only increased with the resurgence of realism in contemporary continental philosophy, namely, so-called "speculative realism." This tradition finds its origin in Quentin Meillassoux's critique of correlationsim, i.e. the notion that objectivity must always be correlated with subjectivity, which he finds first in Kant, only to see this trend extend up to phenomenology. Perhaps Italy's most notable proponent of this "new realism," including its scathing critique of Kant as correlationist and anti-realist, is Maurizio Ferraris.

The debate about whether Kant's transcendental philosophy is compatible with realism – not just an "empirical realism" that must be correlated with a "transcendental idealism," but realism all the way down – however, is a long one that precedes contemporary philosophy's desire for a radical and robust realism. In fact, one of the first critics of Kant's transcendental philosophy was F.W.J. Schelling. Schelling, however, although seeking a "higher realism" and a "superior empiricism," did not abandon transcendental philosophy, but he rather argued for an "inverted transcendentalism." Similarly, in the 20th century, Gilles Deleuze, a self-proclaimed "pure metaphysician" who was largely critical of Kant, argued for a "transcendental empiricism."

My paper will take its cues, then, from Schelling, one of the earliest critics of Kant's transcendental philosophy, and Deleuze, a recent critic. In this way, I will argue that transcendental philosophy can and must survive into the future, even 300 years into the future, but only by being inverted. In short, rather than the conditions of possible experience having to be a priori and thus located within subjectivity, transcendental philosophy must rather ask how subjectivity and the space of reason is first constituted. In Schelling's language, "there is not being because there is thinking, but there is thinking because there is being," and in Deleuze's language one asks how the given first produces the subject to whom it is given.

This project is still transcendental insofar as the conditions of experience are not themselves other objects of experience, other appearances, i.e. it is not simply a causal explanation like the ones offered by neuroscientists, but this does not necessitate that these conditions must be located at a remove from experience itself. Transcendental philosophy must thus become centripetal rather than centrifugal. Instead of beginning with subjectivity and then asking how experiential knowledge is possible, i.e. how the subject can come into contact with and render sensible "external" intuition, transcendental philosophy, if it hopes to survive in the future, must rather ask how a space of subjectivity, how the domain of thought, is first hollowed out. How does the outside, Meillassoux's "great outdoors" and Schelling's "absolute transcendence," first produce an inside, i.e. "relative transcendence," an interior domain of thought and reason.

Keywords: transcendental philosophy, realism, Maurizio Ferraris, F.W.J. Schelling, Gilles Deleuze

On Freedom and the Politics of Manipulation

Immanuel Kant's philosophical corpus, especially his three major critiques, provides profound aspects of human nature, morality and the foundations of knowledge. His theoretical framework is still relevant and can provide answers to contemporary and future concerns. This paper critically examines the relationship between Immanuel Kant's concept of freedom as practical reason and the politics of manipulation, considering how various forms of political and social influence can undermine a person's autonomy. In particular, this paper explores how manipulation, as a form of influence that undermines rational choice and action, is a direct threat to autonomy and examines our moral responsibility towards such policies.

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant shifts from theoretical philosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason to practical philosophy, exploring the foundations of morality. Here, freedom is perceived as autonomy, the foundation of moral agency. Kant argues that moral principles, expressed as categorical imperatives, bind rational agents due to their capacity for freedom. In the political realm, this implies that legitimate political authority must respect and promote the autonomy of its citizens. The ability to legislate moral laws for oneself, guided by reason rather than tendencies and desires, is fundamental to democratic governance and the protection of individual rights.

Manipulation, whether through propaganda, misinformation or coercion, seeks to influence individuals in ways that undermine their rational capacities. Such politics are morally questionable, because they violate the autonomy of the person, treating personhood as mean to an end and not as end in himself/herself. This paper argues that manipulation, by perverting the conditions necessary for autonomy, is a violation of Kant's categorical imperative and undermines the moral foundation of political life.

Moreover, contemporary political practices and technologies of influence are driving the increasing sophistication of manipulative techniques in the digital age. Targeted advertising, social media algorithms, state-sponsored propaganda and disinformation campaigns are threats to practical freedom, as presented in the Kantian corpus. Based on Kantian moral theory, this paper argues that a just political system must protect and actively promote the conditions for person's autonomy by ensuring that citizens can exercise their rational capacities without unjustified interference.

Finally, the paper explores the moral responsibility of persons to resist to the politics of manipulation. On the basis of Kant's idea of enlightenment - understood as "emergence from self-imposed immaturity" - this paper argues that cultivating practical reason and resisting manipulation are not only person's duties but also political imperatives.

In conclusion, this paper seeks to contribute to the broader discourse on autonomy, moral philosophy and political theory by offering a Kantian framework for understanding and resisting increasingly sophisticated techniques of political and social manipulation in contemporary democratic societies.

Keywords: Freedom, Autonomy, Manipulation, Moral Responsibility

The Challenges to “the Banality of Evil” and a Solution in Kant’s Religion

In *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Hannah Arendt depicts Adolf Eichmann as a symbol of the banality of evil. The fact that the specific issue he deals with – the Holocaust – is appalling does not mean that he aims at anything with depth. On the contrary, his indifference to the millions of lives proves his shallowness and mindlessness.

In Section 1, I will argue that the asymmetry between the depth of good and that of evil Arendt suggests is shared by Kant in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. For example, both think that good is intimately related to thinking or reason, which enables us to reach a universal viewpoint, while evil is more particular, sensual and therefore superficial. However, two serious challenges to this view will be demonstrated in Sections 2 and 3.

Section 2 is devoted to the facticity of radical evil, based on Jean Améry’s recollection of being tortured by the Gestapo. The very vivid first-person experience of the radical evil of Nazism drives Améry to the conclusion that “evil overlays and exceeds banality. For there is no ‘banality of evil,’ and Hannah Arendt, who wrote about it in her *Eichmann* book, knew the enemy of mankind only from hearsay, saw him only through the glass cage.” (2009, p.25) The facticity of evil highlights the undeniable phenomenological depth of evil.

Section 3 focuses on the formality of thinking. Thinking, which is taken as a solution to the banality of evil by Arendt, is the very trigger of Eichmann’s evil. According to Bettina Stangneth (2014), who read through the post-war writings Eichmann produced in Argentina, Arendt’s diagnosis of Eichmann’s evil-doing is wrong, because Eichmann-in-(his-own-)writing “wanted power but not via capricious acts, ruthless aggression, a uniform, or an order; it had to be legitimated by a system of thought and values that allowed his actions to seem ‘right’”. (2014, p.211). Eichmann’s attempts to justify his action with maxims show that a certain depth of thinking cannot prevent people from evil but builds the inner fortitude of evil-doers.

In Section 4, I will argue that if we consider the banality of evil and the objections it encounters, we might be led to Kant’s position in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. Kant’s stance is deeply shaped by his concerns about the facticity of evil and the formality of thinking. First, radical evil going beyond anything bare contingency could bring to the world is a fact as undeniable as “practical reason”. Second, evil appears in the guise of maxims, the universality of which is pseudo. However, thinking contributes to evil in a way Arendt’s account and Kant’s earlier theory overlook.

Therefore, two aims will be achieved by this comparison: to examine Arendt’s theory of the banality of evil in view of the two objections and to shed light on the transition of stances of Kant.

Keywords: radical evil, the banality of evil, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, moral philosophy, facticity.

What can Kant's Barber and Wigmaker tell us about the Concept of Modern Equality?

Modern equality is not a flat sameness. Rather, it is based on the right to difference, even in economic terms: Both a CEO and a cleaner in a modern rule of law [Rechtsstaat], no matter how radically different they may be in all realms of life, have an equal legal validity and value as legal persons. This means that there is no hierarchy between them. Difference in the modern sense, however, cannot be conceived without modern equality: premodernity knew no differences, but only hierarchies. So, what we take for granted today as our subjective particularities and value under the banner of diversity, is a product of modernity. Yet a crucial question arises here, that is: what is the condition of possibility of stripping individual particularities of any hierarchy and conceiving them as equally valid subjective differences?

This paper will work out a crucial condition of possibility of modern equality based on Kant's comparison between his barber and his wigmaker in a footnote in his essay *On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice* (1793). There, Kant denies the legal-political equality of the worker (*operarius*) and the artisan (*artifex*), with the sole difference that the former only has its labor power of which he allows others to make use, while the latter produces a product that he can sell. This comparison reveals, *ex negativo*, a crucial condition of the possibility of the modern concept of equality, that is, of thinking differences without hierarchy. This condition concerns the equal validity of human labor as an abstract unified quality which established itself in later modernity and became the mediating instance in the development of modern equality as the right to develop subjective differences.

Kant's comparison of the barber and the wigmaker points out a threshold in modernity: it is quite striking that Kant acknowledges the abstract labor, but does not recognize it as an equally valid quality, that is as a mere quantity and as such, the basis of all production, but puts a clear hierarchy between labor and work. What Kant's wigmaker and barber will show us is that it is the dissolution of the hierarchy between their activities that is transferred to their political and social existence.

The analysis of this hierarchy, as a last remnant of premodernity, can allow us to conceive modern equality as the right to difference. The main aim is then to show that it is the fully established transformation of a conception of human labor from quality to an equivalent [gleich gültig] and indifferent [gleichgültig] quality, i.e. as a mere equalized quality as quantity in later modernity, that allows the modern concept of equality in the legal sphere to flourish in a far-reaching room for subjective differences without the legal-political hierarchies of premodern times.

Keywords: Philosophy of Right, Modern Equality, Right to Difference, Hierarchy, Labor, Work.